Proceedings:

American Enterprise Institute

The Perils of Populism: Hot Spots in Latin America

12:45 p.m.	Registration
1:00	Keynote Speaker:	Marisol Argueta, foreign minister of El Salvador
		“The Challenges to Democratic Institutions in the Americas”
1:40	Discussants:	Jaime Aparicio, former ambassador of Bolivia to the United States
		Javier El-Hage, Human Rights Foundation
	Moderator:	Roger F. Noriega, AEI
3:00	Adjournment

September 18, 2008

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

Roger F. Noriega:  -- Canciller Argueta de Barillas specializes in international relations, human rights, conflict resolution, and development.  She was an adviser to the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry from 2004 to 2007, and general director for bilateral and multilateral foreign policy, in the ministry, from 1999 to 2004.  She previously served as a representative to the United Nations and the Embassy of El Salvador here in the United States where she made many friends, some of whom are here today.

Canciller Argueta de Barillas also is a board member of the International Institute of Women and the Salvadoran Foundation for Seniors.  She has been a coordinator of the International Conference of Middle-Income Countries and the Salvadoran representative for the Central-American Integration System.

Those of us who have worked or who currently work in U.S. Diplomacy also recognize that Canciller Argueta and her colleagues from El Salvador are part of a very elite and, unfortunately, very small club; we call them allies.  In diplomacy, a colleague of mine once observed that the Salvadorans not only want to help; they know how to help.  They are committed, principled professionals.

I want to acknowledge, as a U.S. citizen, that El Salvador has hundreds of its best young men serving in Iraq, alongside our troops, 300 of their men.  Three hundred of those men are in Iraq today.  They are professional, able soldiers worthy of their country.  And five Salvadorans lost their lives doing their duty as they saw it.  President Saca saw it this way in explaining his commitment, which has to be an extraordinarily tough decision, “We identify ourselves with liberty.  We identify ourselves with the United States.  We are partners.  We are allies.  And of course, a great part of this decision has to do with the belief that we are making a great contribution toward creating peace in Iraq,” and history will record that they did just that.

And it is precisely because the Salvadorans have struggled for freedom that they value it so much.  It is because we stood with them that they now stand with us.  And it is why Canciller Argueta is uniquely qualified to alert us today to the aggressive campaign being waged by our enemies to knock the pillars out from under democracy, right here, close to home.  Please join me in welcoming our keynote speaker for this afternoon, Canciller Argueta.

Marisol Argueta:  Good afternoon, everybody.  I’m really excited to be here today and I’m especially thankful for my friend, Ambassador Roger Noriega for having invited me to be here with you this afternoon.  We cherish the relation with Washington, as he mentioned, and we also have a very strong bond with this institution.  Thank you very much for having me here today.

Let me -- allow me to shape out this discussion by briefly presenting you some ideas that I hope will set the tone for a fruitful exchange on the issue that we are going to discuss this afternoon.  As you may know, during the last decades, Latin America has economically performed quite well.  Economic growth has revived, healthy fiscal policies are in place, prudent monetary policies have shielded our currencies.  Inflation is also under control. 

Exports and markets for our products have diversified and practically healthy economies characterize the region.  Overall, Latin America has been growing at a steady rate exceeding four percent from 2005 to 2007.  Extreme poverty has been reduced.  The region, overall, has seen an increased in human development as it is indexed by the United Nations.  Fiscal stability has enabled governments to implement social policies that are aimed at improving health, housing, and education among our citizens.

On the political front, all but one country in the hemisphere qualifies as a democratically-elected government.  Strong party systems have allowed parties from a broad political spectrum to come to power by fairly and freely winning presidential, municipal, and legislative elections.  My own country, El Salvador, is a good example of such a political progress, as for us Salvadorans have been able to transform our country from a war-torn country into a peaceful and free nation, a functional democracy and a small, vibrant, and dollarized economy. 

These transformations have allowed our country to become a reliable friend and ally of the United States of America.  The entry into force of CAFTA-DR in March 2006, the signing of a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation in November 2007 for the development of the Northern region of El Salvador, U.S. economic assistance for reconstruction of the country after the two back-to-back earthquakes that destroyed our in country in 2001, the granting of the temporary protected status that allows tens of thousands of Salvadorans to live and work legally in the United States are only a few examples that illustrate the close relations that exist between our two nations.

El Salvador is the only country in the Western Hemisphere that is a member of the coalition of the multilateral force fighting the war against terrorism in Iraq.  The 11th rotation of Battalion Cuscatlán is currently deployed in Iraq and the 12th rotation is ready to be deployed soon.  Our country remains committed to fight common threats with the United States and to contribute to peace and stability around the world. 

Our country is also participating in peace missions in Lebanon as part of the U.N. Blue Helmets Mission and keeping peace forces in Haiti and in sub-Saharan countries in Africa.  We are cooperating with the United States in combating drug trafficking in the region as El Salvador’s international airport is one of the three forwarding operating locations known as FOLS in Latin America.  We are also partnering in combating organized crime, gang activities, money laundering, and other forms of multi-lateral crime. 

El Salvador serves also as headquarters of the International Law Enforcement Agency, ILEA, under regional headquarters of Interpol, and is looking forward to work together in programs related to the recently approved Merida Initiative.  In this scenario, El Salvador is perhaps, if not the closest, one of the closest U.S. allies in the region.  This is not a coincidence but the manifestation of the convergence of our two nations in the belief of democracy and the system of freedoms as the only means to attain prosperity and [indiscernible] in our development goals.

A contrasting situation to what we are seeing in many other parts of Latin America, where anti-Americanism has reached historic levels.  One just needs to open any newspaper and read the latest headlines in Latin America to realize that the region is full of anti-American manifestations.  Last week, two American ambassadors were ordered out of two South American countries where they were serving.  And for another, his credential letter presentation ceremony that would have enabled him to exercise his duties was deferred. 

Polls show declining favorable views in the U.S. among several countries in Latin America.  Domestic failures, discontent and social unrest in their region are quickly distracted and blamed on the United States.  The strong Latin American’s support for the U.S. after the 2000 terrorist attacks and their campaign against terror in Iraq has faded.

There exists also an increasing disenchantment with globalization under neo-liberal system.  Latin Americans feel that the economic policies for the last 20 years governments have put in place have yet to deliver prosperity and equality.  Moreover, many that are after the consolidation of peace and democracy in the region, economic and social benefits, have not arrived as promised. 

We are therefore seeing the emerging of movements in leaders that want to revive old populist methods that have failed before.  They call for the nationalization of country resources and services; state control of trade and production, and a collection of irresponsible and unsustained subsidies.  All is done in the name of their peoples and with a promise of a better future for all citizens regardless of their social condition. 

To complicate matters even further, recently we have witnessed trans-Atlantic alliances that might turn the region into a new ground where the former Cold War adversaries may arm-wrestle to prove their military might.  Even recent delicate international issues such as tensions in Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia are now matters that become opportunities to accentuate ideological division in the Latin American region. 

What has happened?  What has gone wrong?  This week, in an op-ed piece in a Salvadoran newspaper, a well-known columnist quoted analyst Roberto Artavia of INCAE, an illustration of what has occurred in Latin America.  Artavia compares neo-populist countries in the region with a patient that has been prescribed a long-spectrum drug for 45 days and by the 20th day, on having had partial or no results at all, decides to quit taking the pills, and then the worst happens.  To me this is very telling.  Frustrated, a group of Latin American nations have decided to quit taking their prescribed medicines and have decided to change regardless of consequences just because they have felt that the urgent need to try some other quick-relief drugs and then instead of getting better, they really get worse.

But that has not happened by chance.  There is a perception that the United States has neglected the region.  Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, quite understandably, the United States shifted its foreign policy priorities to other regions of the world.  As many geopolitical analysts have pointed out, Latin America has been subsidizing U.S. foreign policy in other parts of the world.  Such a neglect has created a vacuum that has been filled by demagoguery and by false hope.  The cost of fuel has not helped either.  High oil prices have allowed oil-rich countries in Latin America to develop initiatives that in the end increase fuel prices.  Some countries have brought into these offers.  Further, funds from these programs are diverted to finance left political parties.

Dear friends, the United States needs to do more.  Friends and allies need to be treated differently.  There are important issues such as national and atmospheric security, combating organized crime, illegal drugs, gangs, terrorism, and assets laundering and immigration, in which the U.S. needs to have a close collaboration with Latin America.

Take as an example the Merida Initiative.  As earmarked, funds are insufficient for Central America.  Sixty-five million dollars have been allocated for Central America and the Caribbean region to finance programs and projects to fight narco-traffic, smuggling and weapons, and the fight against gangs.  Allocation of these resources should clearly reflect an individual cooperation response from each country in the region.  Organized crime and drug trafficking recognizes no border, and to affect such problems, we must have a comprehensive and balanced approach to the region as a whole. 

It is for us a contraction that while great importance is given to expanding the scope of that forwarding operating location in El Salvador; fewer resources are allocated in the form of new and better equipment to monitor crime in Central America. 

As for immigration, the U.S. needs to quickly retake the issue in an integral matter.  We were so discouraged to see the failure of the administration and Congress to agree on a comprehensive immigration reform package.  The U.S. is home to more than a million Salvadorans.  To us, immigration relief for every single one of them is a valued matter of social and economic security.

Deportations are also a worrisome issue.  While Salvadorans work hard to send remittances to our relatives in El Salvador, their stability is threatened by the fear of increasing raids, making them victims to unscrupulous employers and human rights abuses.  On the receiving side, our country increasingly faces the deportation of criminals that land free in our territory, having not committed crimes over there.  From January to August 2008, the United States has deported 13,693 Salvadorans, out of which 4,299 have criminal records.  We need to have a shared-responsibility approach.  This is a problem for both our countries since many of these repatriated criminals quickly find their way back to the United States, creating a vicious circle and coming back through the revolving door.

The U.S. needs to engage more with the region.  Americans need to pay more attention to what is going on in Latin America.  Foes are grouping and getting stronger.  As you mentioned, Ambassador Noriega, allies are becoming fewer.  In particular, the United States must pay close attention to what is happening in El Salvador and to the resulting geopolitical and national security consequences.

The upcoming legislative and municipal elections in January 2009 followed by the next presidential elections in March 2009 will be, without any doubt, the closest electoral competitions in El Salvador’s history.  This election will be a battleground where two opposite visions of political thought will be again tested.  This opposition party is a remnant, orthodoxy of the former guerilla.  Some members of its leadership have been closely linked to ETA or to FARC. 

Losing El Salvador will be a lose-lose situation for the security and national interest of both El Salvador and the United States.  It will generate freedom-cutting measures.  It will produce instability in the country and neighboring countries and it will have the potential of making El Salvador go back 30 years in history when Central America was in turmoil.  As President Ronald Reagan said more than 25 years ago in a State of the Union Address, “Tonight, the security of the United States is at stake in El Salvador.”  These words remain in the minds of many of us that need to have more attention being paid to what is going in Central America.

We have invited congressional delegations to come to El Salvador to watch the elections both in January and in March 2009 in order to observe the electoral processes and determine if elections are fair and free.  I just had a meeting with the Secretary of the General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Insulza, who has also engaged in this process.  We have also asked the United States Congress and the administration to support the renewal of TPS for more than 230,000 Salvadorans temporarily protected under that program.  I’m going to see Dr. Rice this afternoon and this is one of the main issues that we are going to talk about. 

Regardless of the U.S. election results, an immigration reform will help El Salvador to implement a successful governmental plan.  The United States must be vigilant that El Salvador continues in the path of freedom, strong rule of law, respect of human rights, and economic modernization, avoiding populism, curtailing individual rights, and repressing political liberties including freedom of speech and freedom of press.

The United States must take seriously the risks and the threats to its security arising from an anti-democratic wave of leaders, whose sole interest is to provoke and damage the United States’ image in the region and in the world.  A U.S. foreign policy toward the region must be reassessed in the view of the growing anti-American sentiment and the installment of an increasing number of anti-U.S. governments in this backyard. 

The United States and our country’s need to establish a security balance in the region, not only from a political point of view, but also with the cooperation approach in another area such as immigration, trade, education, social development that involve the U.S. administration, Congress, multi-lateral institutions such as the OAS and the IDB.  In that regard, we welcome initiatives such as the Growth of Opportunity Partnership of the Americas, and investing in agriculture to combat hunger, because these are the type of programs that could generate from the United States that could guarantee a security balance to confront populist ideas in the region.

Europe is a good example of hemispheric integration.  Even though economic policies are implemented at both national and regional level, under the European Integration Treaty, the regional economic policies are considered a matter of common concern.  Europe’s GDP is €10,957 trillion.  A group of 13 member countries have integrated even further by adopting a single currency, which is used now by more than a half of European’s citizens.  Europe is now strong.  The Western Hemisphere under the leadership of the United States should follow this example with regional development policies aiming at integrating our Americas even more.

Dear friends, Latin America today faces a threat.  The temptation of a quick-result Latin-American neo-socialism; some leaders call if differently.  This is a weird concoction of country-tailored socialist, populist regimes whose common characteristics are getting to power by democratic means, the progressive illumination or weakening of institutions, the disillusion of legislatures, and constitutional reform to introduce endless presidential re-elections, so that leaders can rule timelessly and without any system of check and balances through the populist policies. 

The only way to fight populism is with ideas.  With stories of success that reveal the fallacies of a system that has proven to bring nothing but more poverty to our people.  Those who have followed this expired prescription, as expected, have failed.  El Salvador is now confronting its risk.  The 2009 congressional and presidential elections in our country will be crucial.  If power goes to the wrong hands, El Salvador may very well be the next populist failure in the hemisphere.  I hope it is not.  Thank you very much.

Roger F. Noriega:  The foreign minister has agreed to answer some questions and I’ll exercise my prerogative to ask the first question, denying Norm Bailey the traditional first question.

I had the pleasure of visiting Central America about a month ago, including El Salvador and also visited Guatemala and Honduras, and my colleagues went on Nicaragua and Panama, and we were also -- all three of us in El Salvador, were looking at the narcotics trafficking situation and the lawlessness accompanying the emergence of even stronger, more visceral strains of these illegal syndicates that have been pushed south by Mexico’s efforts. 

I think it is really extraordinarily important for us to recognize that first and foremost, you need political will to confront this criminality which has such a profound effect on our way of life and well being of this country, the United States, so we need strong friends and allies.  With all due respect, I find the majority of the governments there really uncommitted to the fight, not even recognizing how tough it is. 

El Salvador is definitely the exception.  Those of us who do not think the elections have consequences and that we can work with whoever is elected should seize very clearly on the reality that the forward operating location in El Salvador is not something that the FMLN would support, and I will not ask you to comment on that.  But the broader issue is to fight the narco-trafficking; you need the political will and institutions.  So to what extent do you think narco-traffickers themselves and those that abet them in their own countries, for example in Venezuela, have an interest in seeing the denigration of democracy and institutions precisely to be creating free-fire zones for narco-trafficking?

Marisol Argueta:  Well, there is definitely a link between the two issues.  We have been very careful by offering El Salvador as the headquarters for all these international organizations and institutions to combat crime, precisely because we are aware of the threat that is posed by leaving institutions without the strength and the moral backing for them to be democratic, to continue to be effective in that fight.  We are worried with our neighboring countries with the situation that has grown with respect to drug trafficking and money laundering.  We have a very strong legal system that combats that but the same has not happened in the rest of the region. 

Central America is definitely the road from South America to the United States for drug trafficking, and in that sense, we believe it is very important that the U.S. looks at friend countries as allies and give us resources.  We have offered this space for the forwarding operating location but we do not have all the resources; we do not have all the technology to put it to work at its potential.  That is definitely one of the issues that we are talking with the Ministry of Defense of El Salvador and that will be raised this afternoon with Dr. Rice as well.

Roger F. Noriega:  Great.  Thank you very much for that clear answer.  You have the microphone?  This gentleman here has the microphone.  Please raise your hands; we will go to Norm Bailey and then Frank Calzone [phonetic].  Wait for the microphone please.

Norm Bailey:  Thank you very much, and thank you Madam Minister for your remarks and I agree with you completely.  Much more attention needs to be paid to the various threats to the security of the United States and to the Hemisphere than is being paid at the present time.  My question has to do with whether you have some idea as to the reason why the Honduran government has decided to become part of the so-called Bolivarian Revolution in the Western Hemisphere?

Marisol Argueta:  Well, we are quite disappointed and worried with that decision made by Honduras.  As you know, Guatemala is following, possibly, that same path and even Costa Rica has announced some interest in following the same idea with Venezuela.  As I mentioned in my speech, I think it is a very easy way of getting funds, of trying to reduce the impact of the price of oil in the countries.  It is not a solution that we will be taking in the short term. 

It is something that is going long term, but what is more worrisome, is that there is indebtedness for long term, and what happens?  The countries that are giving these donations are not only giving quick cash for fast projects for leftist governments, but are also in the long term becoming indebted with the country that will control the finances of Latin America in the end.  We are trying to prevent the integration system of Central America to be destroyed by the interaction of countries foreign to Central America.  It is one of the big challenges that we are facing.  We are very small countries as you know and we portray ourselves as becoming a part of the globalization and becoming much more competitive as a region than individually. 

So this is something that is really becoming a concern for our government.  What we are practically trying to do right now is to concentrate in social development as part of the integration that has not yet developed, as the political area is probably going to be stagnated by these foreign actors.  And at the same time, economic development has its own ongoing process.  We believe stressing the impact of security of working together towards a common security regime, it is important, and social development is also important.

You know, there is going to be elections in Honduras next year and I believe, again, it is very important, the reaction or the policy that the United States exerts with Honduras.  Hondurans, Nicaraguans, and Salvadorans are being protected by the TPS, by the Temporary Protected Status, and immigration benefits and we are hoping that Hondurans and Nicaraguans also have an extension of their temporary protected status.  Otherwise, it would be very negative -- it would have a very negative impact on the whole region, if we see further deportations of Hondurans and Nicaraguans.  But a clear expression of a differentiated action should also be envisioned by the United States policies where you cannot treat allies in the same way as you treat friends.

Frank Calzone:  Señora Ministro, you mentioned about the regional outlook and my question, very briefly, is two for one.  What can you tell us about the impact of the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba in this regional situation which is still developing?  And two, you are going to be seeing Secretary Rice.  If you had a chance to sit down with the President, you told us that some governments have changed, they no longer take the pills they are supposed to take, what would you tell the President what is wrong, what could be improved in his foreign policy towards Latin America?

Marisol Argueta:  Well, I believe this is a matter of leadership and prestige, and as I mentioned, there is a vacuum.  I think the American policies have shifted to other regions where there is more concern.  I was shocked this morning when looking at the news about the bomb at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, and it is understandable that there is a lot of attention being paid and a lot of resources allocated to fighting terrorism.  But that should not be in lieu of what is not being done in Latin America. 

What I mean is that they are not exclusive of each other.  The U.S. has enough resources and enough vision to work and to fight its main concerns as defending the national interest but at the same time, to pay close attention to the risks that are being posed in the neighborhood.  I do not believe that the extent of what is going on in Latin America should have happened if we had engaged in a different sort of common action with the United States. 

That is one of the reasons I mentioned Europe.  Look at the European model.  They have, each one of the 27 countries in the European Union, different languages, different cultures, different ethnic backgrounds, and they are working together to build a block of countries that are healthy in its economics, that are working together in most of the security issues, they have a common immigration policy, and if we could see ourselves in the Western Hemisphere, in a similar path, I think that would make a very strong difference.  We would close a space for ideological differences. 

You can see in Europe the co-existing of socialist governments with conservative governments but all working with the same medium and long-term vision and that is what I think has failed in our hemisphere.  We need strong leaderships.  We need to establish an agenda of issues that are of common concern, security, immigration, economics, trade, and to have funds so that we can also work together in those smaller threats that are being an obstacle for our development.  I think an integral re-assessment of the relations and a vision needs to be put in place.

Roger F. Noriega:  Let me ask you, Madam Foreign Minister, what do you think the impact would be of Congress adjourning this year without approving the Colombia Free Trade Agreement, and how important do you think approval of that agreement would be to a new administration, setting out on a positive footing with Latin America?

Marisol Argueta:  Well, again, that is another unclear and negative message that is being sent to Latin America.  Colombia is together with El Salvador and with one or two other countries, the closest to the United States, and sending such a negative message is what is becoming so confusing and so negative in the relations.  I think Congress has to sophisticate a little more the assessment of what the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia will mean.  They need the Free Trade Agreement to be passed.  They need it because it is a matter of security.  Not only for Colombia.  It is a matter of security for the United States. 

It is a way of combating terrorism as well.  And that is what it is partly un-understood in Latin America, how the U.S. Congress is not able to see what is clear to the rest of us.  How it is so easily connected in Latin America as a way of responding to a country that is struggling, that is fighting with the U.S. against terrorism, with a president that is as popular as President Uribe who has also shown his commitment to work with democracy, to work with freedoms, and to work against all the challenges and risks that are being posed in Central America, and I would definitely send a message to Congress, I know they’ve been doing so many efforts. 

Our Embassy here in Washington has also helped and supported the efforts of the Colombian government to pass this law and we just do not understand what is going in Congress.  It seems that there is no understanding of Latin America.  And I think the work of organizations as yours could be very important in placing Latin America clearly in the agenda of the U.S. Congress and administration.

Roger F. Noriega:  We thank you for your contributing of that influence with your appearance today and your very clear message.  Do you have time for one question or no?

Marisol Argueta:  Yes, please.

Roger F. Noriega:  Okay, I guess -- we've got -- do you have time for two questions?

Marisol Argueta:  Yes, sure.

Roger F. Noriega:  Okay.  Back here with these two ladies at the table here.

Female Voice:  83.4 percent of Salvadorans do not support the war in Iraq and El Salvador’s sending troops, and yet the Saca administration has continued to send troops since 2003, and I know that the conservative block has continued to say it is to support -- it is an exchange in some ways for TPS or an MCC grant, yet Nicaragua and Honduras both enjoy the MCC grants as well as the TPS -- the renewal of their TPS thus far.  So, I’m curious as to how the Salvadoran government and the ARENA presidential candidate, Rodrigo Avila, can continue to justify the deployment of Salvadoran troops to Iraq.

Marisol Argueta:  Well, as you know, relations with countries are based on common interests and common values.  In the case of our deployment of troops to Iraq, it is an issue of values and to the fight against terrorism.  Our 12th Battalion is now working in reconstruction.  We ourselves were benefitted by multi-lateral forces that helped us reconstruct the country after the conflict in the 1980’s and it is a way of paying back, what we are doing.  We feel very proud to be present in Iraq and we feel very proud to be helping that country reconstruct.  As you know, there has been an intention to make the coalition smaller, and we would be ready to accompany the efforts as long as they are needed in Iraq.

Roger F. Noriega:  It is an interesting point though because, I mentioned about principal leadership and that includes how you govern at home in addition to your foreign policy and whether you stand for anything in the world.  And the wreck of the Nicaraguan government and the wreckage of the Honduran government leads me to believe that we should -- as you sort of intimate, we should review our MCC assistance to those governments, those corrupt governments.  That’s my personal opinion.  Did you have a question?

Marisol Argueta:  If I just may, excuse me, comment on your comment, and that is exactly one of the messages that we are trying to bring.  The U.S. is not sending a clear message of recognizing the effort of a country that is fighting together for values, for the same principles than to others that are just -- let me say -- free-riders, just use the WTO acronyms, but in fact, that is what is a little disturbing and it is something that is not comprehended, that is not understood.  With the Merida Initiative as I mentioned, they are allocating resources generally.  They’re not making an intelligent allocation to individual countries that are responding better to the United States, and I think that is something extremely important to pay attention to.

Roger F. Noriega:  Thank you very much.  Ma’am?

Female Voice:  [indiscernible] with the increasing presence of Iran in the hemisphere [sounds like], has a very large embassy they now have in Nicaragua and their plans on [indiscernible] Nicaragua to the other, I was wondering if in El Salvador, what you see in terms of the remaining presence of [indiscernible].

Marisol Argueta:  Thank you very much for your question.  I think it is very relevant, and that is another issue that I did not touch on my intervention.  But besides leaving our space ready in South America for submarines, that will be close to the United States, with regards to the Russian approach that is being made with Venezuela. 

Let’s look at Iran.  That’s another threat.  The embassy of Iran in Nicaragua has more than 50 diplomats, and I received a call from the foreign minister of Iran about three weeks ago.  He insistently called, we do not have diplomatic relations with Iran but I had to reply to his call, and what he mentioned is that he offered $150 million as a fund for the development of Central America.  I thanked him, of course, but we are not going to follow into that path.  At least El Salvador, the current administration, is very clear on that.  But while you are listening to that offer of Iran, of $150 million, we are receiving -- the whole region $65 million from the U.S. in terms of the Merida Initiative.

So I think that is another very clear example of how resources by the American administration and Congress should be analyzed and allocated in not only for which purposes but for who are these allocated.  We are really concerned with the presence of Iran, especially because we have also worked together with Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador in a form of a common immigration ground.  We would not be ready to allow the Salvadoran territory to be part of a terrorist scheme.

Roger F. Noriega:  Thank you very much.  I believe that is all in terms of questions.  We want to thank you very much for your presentation.  It was very illuminating and one of the things that we did not talk very much about the internal Salvadoran politics but I will just simply comment that there is a very intense contest going on there and where the many in El Salvador have, I think, let down their guard in terms of what the FMLN really means. 

Even one of my Democratic colleagues was commenting, “Well, these people signed a peace accord and it is instructive that quite literally, the people that are running the FMLN in the day had nothing to do with signing the peace accords,” and as matter of fact, the war is still raging in the form of functionaries -- really not functionaries, but leadership of the FMLN who are helping the FARC and manage its affairs and Lord knows what they are really doing. 

So, I would hope that you would take back the message that they should recognize the incremental way in which Venezuelans said, “Well, look, Hugo Chavez can’t really do that much harm.”  And when you let that person who held a gun to the former democratically-elected President’s head, and you elect him president and turn your democracy over to the person, a coup-maker like that, do not be surprised what you get.  And when you turn your government over to a group that has never renounced really or apologized sufficiently for the campaign of terror that it waged on its own people, do not be surprised what you get.  So I hope that Salvadorans will exercise their characteristic wisdom and do the right thing, but I know voting in El Salvador [cross-talking] I’m staunchly committed to democracy in El Salvador.

Marisol Argueta:  Thank you very much.  That’s why it is very important that the U.S. message is not, “We will be able to work in the same way with whomever gets elected in El Salvador.”  It will not be such.

Roger F. Noriega:  Right.  And my view is, if you are incapable of seeing the difference between good and evil, how do you know whether you are doing good?  And I think our diplomacy needs to be willing to make some choices.  Thank you very much.

Marisol Argueta:  [cross-talking].  Thank you very much.  Thank you everybody.

Roger F. Noriega:  Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to start the next panel immediately after I collect my gift.

[Break 45:45-48:54]

Roger F. Noriega:  Okay, ladies and gentlemen, we are going to continue with the second panel and I would invite folks to take some seats up front where there are some seats that are open.  If you want to, Michael may.  I’ll just start calling out names.  Miguel, there is a seat at the table up front, and folks at the edges, if you want to have a seat, you are certainly welcome.  We will continue with our next panel and I will begin by making a couple of opening comments to put things in some context.

Only the most zealous or naïve outsider would challenge the right of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to wreck his own country.  But we now know that he has converted his politics of rant and division into policies of criminality, terror, and aggression, and that is our business.  Guerilla computer records captured on March 1 in a terror camp in Ecuador have confirmed lingering suspicions of Venezuela’s substantial support to narco-terrorists of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, the FARC. 

Thus far, U.S. authorities have used this data to sanction three senior Chavez’ aides for aiding and abetting the FARQ.  One by one, other Chavez co-conspirators will be identified publicly and sanctioned summarily.  And the Bolivarian Republic will be unmasked as an aggressive, bandit-state that has provided material support to criminals, terrorists, and troublemakers who have sown instability throughout the Americas. 

Let’s be clear.  Our friends in the region can no longer pretend that this is a tug-of-war between Venezuela and the United States.  Chavez’s decision to expel Ambassador Patrick Duddy and his rehashed assassination plots are merely desperate attempts to whip up anti-American sentiments as a smokescreen to conceal his own shaky position at home.  But despite years of Chavez’s idle threats, the United States continues to get at least 13 percent of its oil from Venezuela.  Chavez knows that were he to interfere with these U.S. sales, he would be committing economic and political suicide. 

So, believe it or not, the United States is actually doing better than most in its dealings with Hugo Chavez.  The Venezuelan people and their Latin brothers are paying the price for Chavez’s corruption and imperialist project.  It is clear that Chavez has squandered the oil wealth of the Venezuelan people to fund the political campaigns of his acolytes throughout the region.  He has funneled money to internal groups that sow unrest and agitate against democratically elected governments. 

He backs political leaders that are committed to dismantling fragile democratic institutions and replacing them with authoritarian, intolerant regimes that thrive on political polarization and social division.  These governments cloak themselves in anti-U.S. rhetoric as mostly a cynical exercise to corner their internal enemies and hoard power, and perhaps, because the United States is the only country willing, more or less, to criticize this backward march to strongman populism.

In Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, Chavez’s spear carriers are warring with their own people, and it is difficult to see how any good is coming from their destructive agendas.  But that is the way Chavez wants it.  He makes trouble for trouble’s sake.  That is why he arranges warm greetings in Latin capitals from President Mahmud Ahmadinejad just as his Iranian regime is defying international nuclear safeguards.  He props up the gasping Castro brother’s regime to prolong the torment of 11 million Cubans. 

He distracts weak Central American and Caribbean governments away from free-market solutions with the lure of debt-laden oil deals.  He has willfully surrendered Venezuelan airspace to drug smugglers.  He provides weapons, ammunition, and refuge to a terrorist group fighting a democratically-elected neighbor and preying on his own people.  And he invites Russian bombers into the Western Hemisphere as if he is playing the last of his well-worn cards in an old, dangerous game.  His anti-American agenda has sown destructive seeds throughout Latin America and our panel will shed light on this campaign.  I’ll introduce them one at a time, beginning with Ambassador Aparicio.

Jaime Aparicio is the president of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States, an advisory body on international juridical matters and on juridical problems in the Americas.  Ambassador Aparicio was Bolivia’s ambassador to the United States from December 2002 to March 2006.  Since June 2006, he has been an envoy on special missions for the Carter Center on issues related to election monitoring and political conflict resolution in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Costa Rica. 

From May 1997 to December 2002, he worked at the OAS as executive secretary of the Summit of the Americas process.  From August 1993 to April 1997, he was under secretary of foreign affairs and acting minister of foreign affairs of Bolivia.  We have seen the news of troubling unrest in Bolivia.  We have heard a very interesting presentation by the foreign minister of El Salvador and we have asked Ambassador Aparicio to comment on both of these things and put them into context for us.  Thank you very much.

Jaime Aparicio:  Thank you very much, Ambassador Noriega, and thank you for having me today at the American Enterprise Institute.  And thank you for including me with this old friend, Marisol, who gave, I think, a brilliant speech and who was very right of sending a message of what could happen in her country, taking into account what is happening in other countries in the region, and as you know, in the last days, not only Bolivia but we have a lot of news that were, in some cases, a kind of joke, like Honduras deciding to postpone the Ambassador’s date for presenting credentials because in solidarity with Bolivia or Nicaragua recognizing South Ossetia, you know, these things, you do not know how to take it. 

But beyond that, I think that shows that there is a proposal, an ideological proposal to push down President Chavez’s agenda in the region.  That’s very clear.  And I think that Marisol was very right when she said why the region is now in this situation.  It is clear that we have to accept some facts, the first one is that this new wave of democracy in the region that started around the 1980’s has changed the region in one sense, but in the other, has failed in providing solutions to real problems, like poverty, discrimination, eliminating corruption. 

Our democracies were not really able to show the people that we are going to change their lives.  Even in Venezuela, as you know, the political class was definitely a disaster and corruption was ramping and people were absolutely frustrated with the political establishment in Venezuela.  In that sense, President Chavez is more of a consequence of that failed policy or that failed political establishment.  But as we are seeing now, the result is much worse than with what we have in the past. 

In the case of Bolivia, it is much more complicated than the other countries because there is also an ethnic problem there that Ecuador does not have.  Ecuador is much more a classical left, repeating the same things of the past, the same policies, expecting a different result but it is very difficult to think that it is going to happen.  But in the case of Ecuador, you would see the classical things: confiscations, accumulation of power, restrictions to freedom of expression, the idea of pushing this referendum that would give more power to the president and will establish the possibility of being re-elected.  So it is much more of the classic leftist populism.

In the case of Bolivia, I was saying it is much more complicated because there is real fragmentation of the country because of the ethnic element.  Bolivia is a country that has probably half or a little bit more than half of the population from indigenous origin.  They were excluded for 200 years, that is absolutely true and nobody can deny that.  And there was a point where people said we have to change that.  We have to include everybody because Bolivia should be, and it is basically, a mestizo country, a mixed country, and we should all try to live under a regime that includes everybody.

I think people was -- when we went to elections three years ago, we were expecting to have Quiroga.  Unfortunately, we got Morales.  But that does not hide the reality of the problem.  So I think he was elected for more than 50 percent.  Many people voted for him even though they were not in the same political or ideological line.  President Morales was trapped by an entourage of very ideologically-driven political actors as his minister of the presidency and his vice-president.  They were part of very ideological groups.  They tried to impose a constitution in which was probably a constitution that taken into account the interest of the indigenous people of part of the population of Bolivia basically located in the Highlands but was not a constitution for all the country. 

And that is why despite the absolutely failure of the political opposition, President Morales has no political opposition.  Suddenly, because of this idea of imposing a constitution, the opposition became regional and came from popular elected governors of the most important provinces or departments of Bolivia.  So this was a dysfunctional opposition because it is not an opposition that could compete with him politically.  But in practice is an opposition because President Morales is realizing now that he can’t impose this constitution to all of the country.  So, that is the difference with Venezuela or with Ecuador at this moment where the president realizes that his power is limited by these governors.

And what happened -- and this is what I probably would be very interested to analyze today is that, most of the problems in Bolivia in the last day, as you probably know, we were on the brink of a civil war.  Really, the country was absolutely divided.  Around 30 people died in the Pando, one of the smallest departments of Bolivia, in Amazon side, in the border with Brazil.  The airport was closed so nobody knows how they died, what happened there, all kinds of speculations.  The truth is that around 30 people died, more than 60 or 70 people are wounded and there is no clear information about what happened there.  But if something like that would happen in Santa Cruz, we would be, at this point, really in a civil war. 

So, the situation was very bad.  The U.S. is no longer an actor there.  As you know, the Ambassador was expelled.  The U.S. has taken distance from the region and was no longer an actor.  I think the OAS was even worse because the OAS tried to do a mediation during the last six months and this mediation was going there and supporting President Morales in trying to give him more impulse in this idea of approving the constitution. 

The special envoy, Mr. Caputo, and the other envoys they sent there, even the former vice president of Guatemala.  What they did is they went there and supported the government.  I met some of them during several times and I begged them, “You have to go there and ask for a dialogue, for mediation, for reconciliation.  You can’t go there and support only one side of the problem because if you know the reality of Bolivia, that is going to end up in a serious conflict.”

So I hope this time I think the Secretary General is going again to Bolivia.  He could have a different role and try really to create the environment for a mediation.

But what’s new in all these scenarios, because of this failure of the OAS, this very critical situation in the country, the new fact is that, at some point -- and this is very important for the U.S. and for the new administration in the U.S. next January, is that finally, President Lula decided to do something because this conflict was escalating.  Chavez was totally out of control.  He not only said publicly that he was going to invade Bolivia and send the army if something happened with Morales. 

If the U.S. would have said that, at some point of this last ten years, it would be a global scandal.  But Chavez said it and nothing happened, and he said, “I will send troops to support him,” and absolutely nothing happened, nobody said anything.  Then he started to try to organize this support for Morales with the other countries, and at that point President Lula said, “Well, this is enough.” 

And the President Bachelet of Chile and all the moderate presidents of the region, especially Brazil and Chile, decided to do something.  They called for this meeting in Santiago and they did two things that I think are very important.  First, they stopped President Chavez, and if you read yesterday and today the declarations of Minister Foxley from Chile, it is very clear -- and now they are protesting against Minister Foxley, they are asking him to apologize for what he said, but he said very clearly that this meeting was about to fail because of Chavez’s request of condemning the declaration, the United States, and trying to talk only about the support to President Morales. 

What is interesting is that, in this meeting, during this deliberation of the presidents, there were two messages.  One, to President Chavez, to stop interfering in this problem because President Chavez was not interested in a negotiation with the opposition.  His theory is that he won the referendum with more than 60 percent and he should impose his constitution and he should impose the law and send the army and control the country.  So the message that the President of Chile and the President of Brazil gave to him was, “You are the president.  You were elected.  We recognize you as the president.  There is no doubt that we are going to support you and you have to finish your mandate.  There is no discussion about that.  But you have to sit with the governors and find some kind of compromise.  Otherwise, you are not going to be able to govern the whole country because you can’t go to these departments, you can’t even visit the departments.” 

Second, there is a serious risk that if there is a conflict, it will disrupt all the gas exports to Brazil, and it would create a huge political problem for President Lula, because now, around 30 percent of their gas is supporting Sao Paulo and the big industrial areas of Brazil, so they can’t run the risk that these gas provisions could be disrupted. 

So I think that in the last days, that opened the possibility of a negotiation.  I am optimistic.  As you know, yesterday, they decided to sit in a table.  Chile, initially President Bachelet herself was going to the meeting but she just sent Ambassador Valdes, representing her.  Brazil is sending a minister and Secretary Insulza is going to go there although this is not going to be an OAS mediation, but he is going to be there.  So there is a group and there is going to be some pressure to create the condition for a real negotiation and that would be a good thing. 

I think that in the U.S., probably, the next administration has to take into account that there is a need of engagement in the region, and there is a need to work very closely with friendly governments like Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru, in solving this crisis before President Chavez takes this kind of unilateral positions that could be very damaging. 

And the other thing obviously is this idea of trying to play a global role by inviting Russian army to do these essays [sounds like] in Venezuela, because it is also affecting Bolivia.  Everything he does, he uses also Bolivia and Nicaragua and we are now having a bigger embassy, Iranian embassy there, we have exactly the same problems that it is part of this game that President Chavez is playing and it is affecting our countries.  The same is happening in Ecuador.  As you know, the situation is not very good there.  They have problems on, clearly, very risky situations in terms of security, in terms of rule of law, in terms of concentration of power. 

And I think that at some point, the U.S. has to deal with these issues, has to deal in a very smart manner, trying to put together all these moderate countries in the region and try to find solutions and to stop this kind of aggressive policy that President Chavez is trying to develop in the region.  And I think many of the presidents are already tired of this rhetoric and this kind of actions that Chavez is doing like throwing the U.S. ambassadors and I think that does not help at all our countries. 

As you know, Peru is growing like more than ten percent.  We are in a great economic cycle despite the crisis in the U.S., our countries have been growing.  Peru and Bolivia have the same kind of resources.  Bolivia could be, at this moment, growing really eight, nine, ten percent like Peru is doing.  But we are involved in this ideological conflict and this thing, and we have all this Venezuelan president that it is really conflicting the country with no reason.  So I think that this has to be a more multilateral approach in which the U.S. has to have an important role, and we will see what happens these days.  I hope these negotiations could come up to some kind of compromise and we won’t end up in violence.  Thank you.

Roger F. Noriega:  Thank you very much for the presentation, Ambassador Aparicio.  We will ask our next presenter to offer his views and then we will take questions for the panel.

Javier El-Hage serves as general counsel of the Human Rights Foundation, an organization devoted to the liberation of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners and to the promotion of liberal democracy in the Americas.  The Human Rights Foundation recently launched a new chapter in Ecuador.  Headquartered in Quito, this group is intended to defend the civil and political rights of Ecuadorian citizens, research and publish its findings, and raise awareness about human rights abuses occurring in the country.  The foundation’s international counsel includes six former prisoners of conscience including Armando Valladares, Elie Wiesel, and Harry Wu. 

Mr. El-Hage has been a professor of constitutional law at the Universidad Privada de Santa Cruz, the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, and the Universidad de Aquino Bolivia.  He is the author of several books and articles on international law, democracy, human rights, and drug control policy.  He is currently on a Fulbright Scholarship at Columbia University.  We have asked him to reflect on recent developments in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and react also to the presentations this afternoon.

Javier El-Hage:  Thank you.  First of all, I want to beg your pardon and take the opportunity to express how happy and honored I feel today on sharing this panel with both Ambassador Aparicio who is current chairman of the Inter-American, Juridical Committee and has such an important role to play from the perspective of human rights in terms of enforcing essential elements of democracy and who happens to be fellow Bolivian.  I’m from Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and I just met him today.  Ambassador Noriega, I was still in law school when I read your remarks on the approval of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001, exactly seven years and seven days from this day, and I want to draw my shortcomings on El Salvador’s misformulations [sounds like] from, actually, that framework.

Democracy and human rights.  What is the relationship between democracy and human rights?  And here I want to depart from the concept the minister used for describing countries that in the name of this presentation were described as populist countries.  Some say that they are left leaning countries.  She used the word anti-democratic.  What is the basis to decide whether -- how do we define a country? 

The Inter-American Democratic Charter, the first important thing it did, in Article Three, established five elements as essential for democracy.  Element one, human rights and fundamental freedoms.  Element two access to power under the rule of law and exercise of power under the rule of law.  Element three democratic elections.  Element four a multi-party system.  And element five division of powers and, especially, independence of the judiciary. 

The countries I have been asked to comment on happen to, on a very similar way, violate the five elements that are considered essential of democracy.  These elements are all intertwined, and while violating the independence of a judiciary or the multi-party system, violations are indirectly done to human rights and that reflects in real cases of political prisoners, attacks on freedom of the press, and other liberties violations.  These elements, as I said, are intertwined and constitutional courts, for example, in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, had been systematically attacked and eventually destroyed. 

First, Venezuela, as you all know, was the first country of actually destroying the possibility of having an independent judiciary adjudicating rights that helped, to Venezuela, in pursuing its will of having a constitution passed in 1999.  Ecuador, later, in pursuing the same goal of calling a constitutional convention, in order to pretty much adapt the institutional system to maintaining power, maintaining itself in power, also systematically attacked the constitutional court.  What happens specifically in Ecuador was that after the constitutional court rendered a decision calling unconstitutional the act by the electoral court of suspending 57 representatives of Congress, by rendering that act unconstitutional, the president decided to dismiss nine out of the 11 members of the constitutional court of Ecuador. 

Something very similar happened in Bolivia for the last couple of years where systematic attacks, aggressions, even literal, aggressions, both physical and psychological, have been done to constitutional court members.  A constitutional court that started with ten members, one of them died actually before Evo Morales got into power, right now has only one member and it just can render a decision and that is why.  That’s one of the reasons that institutional terms explain why Bolivia is going through such difficult times in order to, at the end, protect the human rights of people that, as you said Ambassador, are dying and eventually might, because of the violent speech of the government and the complete absence of an institutional system might worsen the situation. 

So, as I said in the Bolivian case, in the Venezuelan case, and the Ecuadorian case, constitutional courts do not exist.  This is intertwined with the fact that legislative power is seriously diminished in its possibility to actually be a place where multi-party system can function.  In the case of Ecuador as I said, 57 representatives were dismissed from one day to another from the electoral court for boycotting -- because they pretty much did not agree to the referendum on the constitutional convention that established that the constitutional convention was going to dissolve Congress once it started functioning.  So because of that, 57 representatives were dismissed.  They were not allowed to enter Parliament literally by armed forces and police officers ordered by the president not to let them in Congress. 

Something very similar happens every time Evo Morales wants to pass an important law in Bolivia because the Senate is controlled by the opposition instead of trying to find an agreement and actually make democracy work they way it should work.  If you do not want to agree to pass a law, then that law should be discussed more and more until you actually reached it, or if you do not reach it, you do not pass it.  Those are the rules of democracy.  Those are the rules by which these presidents were elected in the first place and what happens is that, in Bolivia, whenever they want to pass a law, they make this what they call the Cerco [sounds like] to the Congress.  It is some sort of a fence, a human fence bipartisan of the government that impedes, physically, the entrance of senators to the House of Congress in order to participate in the deliberations of the democratic process. 

So, the multi-party system being attacked has a lot to do with the constitutional courts not existing at all.  In Ecuador besides those facts I’ve already exposed, the 57 representatives not being let in Congress and being dismissed, once the Constitutional Convention was established, one of its first acts was to literally dissolve Congress.  So, Ecuador does not have a Congress since December 2007. 

By the same time in early December 2007, Ecuador took prisoner, indigenous leader from the Amazonian part of Ecuador, Ms. Guadalupe Llori who is still in prison after eight months without a court decision to have her imprisoned.  Having the government, that executive power, disobey three judicial orders to let her free, having the Constitutional Convention itself render an amnesty to everyone that was imprisoned in early December of 2007.  Having that Constitutional Convention render an amnesty, she is still in prison eight months from then.  So, this shows you this close relationship between not having an independent judiciary, not having an effective multi-party system, and ultimately, having systematic violations of human rights. 

One last aspect which is between these five so-called essential elements of democracy according to Article Three of the Inter-American Democratic Charter is the democratic elections element.  These countries also characterized for not pursuing real democratic elections in order to participate in recall processes like the one Bolivia just went in August 10 or any other electoral process.  For example, Venezuela and Nicaragua have both curtailed the possibility of the main opposition leaders on their countries to participate in next elections. 

Specifically, Venezuela suspended on grounds of being indicted with corruption over 200 potential candidates for the next governor and state and municipal elections.  This is, besides curtailing the element, violating the element of Democratic, of granting democratic elections as an essential element of democracy.  It violates the multi-party system and it is confirmed because of the impossibility of an independent constitutional court to decide on the matter according to division of power system. 

The same thing happened in Nicaragua in June when the President of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, did the same thing, very similar thing, arguing that the opposition parties had not met a deadline to present their candidates.  And actually this is a very particular situation because one of the main opposition candidates that was left aside with this process was a former partner of him in the guerilla, in Guatemala, and has a very strong international -- let’s say intellectuals known from being supportive of leftist government, to having even said, literally, in a pronouncement that Daniel Ortega was a dictator ruling in apparent democracy.

So, the other element is the rule of law.  Evo Morales, with this I close on this matter, Evo Morales has said that, literally, in speech, that the rule of law is basically defined by doing legal actions, by not being illegal, by not doing illegal things.  And he pretty much said that he does not care about whether it is legal or illegal, because for that the lawyers exist.  And whenever he wants something that is actually illegal to become legal, he would tell the lawyers to make it legal.  And that is what they do and that was pretty much his position towards what the rule of law means. 

So here, we see typically governments; we talked about Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, governments that accessed -- they came into power following certain rules of democracy.  Thanks to certain rules of democracy, the case of Evo Morales is very patent in this.  Evo Morales, the opposition at some point threw him out of Parliament because he was blocking roads, et cetera.  He was considered to being a troublemaker within Bolivian democracy. 

So, the Congress just threw him out of his representative position.  And what happened was that a constitutional court render that decision of Congress unconstitutional and restored his position in Parliament, at some critical point, in his ascending democratic -- at that point in his career.  And once he is in government, he takes in the task of actually attacking that same constitutional court that allowed him to proceed in the democratic process.  So, this is a very typical thing that happens with all these countries that the minister suggested as anti-democratic countries and they pretty much violate all the essential elements of democracy according to Article Three of the Democratic Charter.

To make an analogy of what is going on with these governments, I would not say that it is a matter of following drug prescriptions from a doctor, taking medicines or drugs not in the correct way or not taken for the complete time they were supposed to, not 45 days but 20.  I would say that what happens here is democracy, for 20 years almost, in most countries in Latin America became a path, a bridge, towards having governments accountable to people to having people elect their governments and decide what type of government they wanted to have. 

And that way, these people in these countries elected Evo Morales, Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa, Daniel Ortega, but what happened is that once they were at the other side of the bridge, they put dynamite to the bridge and they blew it.  That is what they have done pretty much, and they are not giving that same right, that they were given in order to access power, to political rivals that do not have a free press in order to denounce government. 

A free press, the press that simply does not agree with governments, is systematically attacked.  RCTV was closed in Venezuela [indiscernible] a couple of other companies were closed in Ecuador.  The same thing has happened in Bolivia with one television channel and big media, independent media, traditionally independent media, say Unitel and PEATE [phonetic] in Bolivia are systematically attacked, and I’m pretty sure that, in brief, they are going to end up being shut down.

So to close, there is something important here and this is something I draw from Ambassador Noriega’s remarks on the approval of the Inter-American Democratic Charter seven years ago.  And it was that 34 member states of the OAS on September 11, 2001 did not just outline, did not just established what were the five essential elements of democracy but they established a procedure to pursue a sort of punishment, a procedure that would at least hold accountable within the Inter-American System the countries that violated systematically these elements.  And what has happened is that ever since the approval of 2001 and with the upcoming of these governments, the OAS has maintained completely useless, to put it some way, in order to address this commitment that was made by the 34 member states of the OAS seven years ago.

Roger F. Noriega:  Thank you very much for that presentation and join me in thanking our panels.  Well, there is a lot of material there to digest, and I welcome any questions that you might have from the audience.  Let me ask both of you to reflect on how much of this is just the old Gaudismo [sounds like] of the 50s and 60s and why is it more dangerous in your view?

Jaime Aparicio:  I would say that it is a new kind of populism because it is not only now ideologically driven like in the past, but I would say that for the first time and this is a new thing in Latin America, they do not need the United States.  That is a very different thing.  In terms of cooperation, and I disagree with Marisol, she says it is very important, U.S. cooperation.  I think it is not about cooperation. 

There is enough money now in Latin America.  Countries do not need really money.  Their exports are booming.  The mining prices are going up.  There are new markets in China, in India.  It is not only about money and cooperation but they do not need.  They have Venezuelan money.  They have political structure to control the country.  And that is what makes it different because these new populist leaders are convinced that they can control the country in a permanent way.  There are these intents in all these referendums.  There is a common thing. 

If you see the three countries, what they are pretending is the indefinite reelection of the president.  I would say that this new kind of populism is much more stronger in terms of popular support, because in the case of Morales, in the last referendum, despite all these fraud that has happened, evidently, especially in Santa Cruz, where they were trying to raise their votes and they were using a lot of things that were documented and were denounced, I think that what is different is that they are really popular because they are using, in a great way, short-term policies.  They are giving up money.  There is this ethnic connection that it is also new because in the past, populist leaders came from the middle class.  So now there is a very clear ethnic connection between Morales and the people in the highlands. 

So I think it is much more dangerous now because any -- Javier said there is an easy way to government, regardless the legal system and that is a new system they created that it is to accommodate laws to their interest.  So there is no constitutional tribunal.  So now they are talking about cultural and community-oriented laws.  They are talking about a new kind of constitutional tribunal that would represent all the ethnic groups and would run their decisions on a basis of cultural backgrounds.  That means that the Western laws should not apply and they should go back to their community traditions in order to decide what’s constitutional or what is not constitutional. 

So there is a new way of government, apparently in democracy, but it is very difficult to know where this is going to take us because if you have to apply every decision to a tribunal that is composed by 30 different ethnic groups and they would decide on the basis of cultural backgrounds.  It is very difficult to understand but the idea is that it is a way to control this tribunal and it is a good way to control power and to pursue this policy of -- it is basically a policy that, I think, is the big mistake of these systems -- it is a policy of revenge. 

It is not a policy of -- the argument is for 500 years you were mistreating us, you were excluding us, now it is our turn.  So now, you have to support this because it is our time and we would do whatever.  So you sacrifice all the individual rights and that is what happened in Russian and everywhere under this idea of the people.  So now it is the time for the people to enjoy democracy, to enjoy power, and it is time for you to pay the consequences of what you did these last 500 years.  So it is very difficult for the people that are not included in that package to survive.  And that is why you see the Parliaments like Santa Cruz reacting very aggressively against this policy.

Javier El-Hage:  I want to draw differentiating here.  Economic matters from, actually, violation of certain political standards that are going to lead you to eventually violate systematically human rights.  Let me make my point better.  Call it populism in the 21st century, call it military dictatorship in the ‘70s in Latin America, call it fascism in the early 20th century in Italy or Spain, call it communism in half of the world during the 20th century, and you will see in every one of those regimes the same pattern.  No judiciary independence, no multi-party system, no democratic elections, therefore a certain type of rule of law that has little to do with actually protecting human rights and one very symptomatic thing here is the proscription, the curtailing of a free press. 

All of these regimes, and believe me, the Third Reich was one of the starters, are the first state in promoting television.  They actually had very good television developed already by the 30’s in Germany.  And, already, television had a line and they couldn’t depart 1-mm out of the line established by the Third Reich.  So every sort of -- I do not want to call them populism or communism or fascism or communitarianism as they want to call it in Bolivia, I want to call it anti-democratic regimes that, in different intensities, have the same characteristics. 

We are not going to compare the crimes against humanity committed during the Third Reich to over 40 people that have died in Bolivia already because of political violence, but in different intensities, as I say.  All these different systems draw from the same characteristics not abiding by certain specific institutional elements that will allow for a democracy to exist, to be healthy, and to protect human rights which is the aim of the state.

Roger F. Noriega:  That’s exactly right and I know a lot of criticism with the so-called Washington consensus, and I think that is what the foreign minister was referring to, stopping the taking the regime of medicine halfway through, and actually a more virulent strain makes you more susceptible and that is kind of what we did because a lot of countries did not really adopt the microeconomic reforms and strengthen their institutions.  There could be some criticism that that is where we fell down on the job, was pushing the economic agenda without commensurate intense attention to building institutions, and institutions as an instrument of distributing economic opportunity and defending essential rights.  And we fell down on the job.  Did you have another comment?  Let me just take a question here from down front here.

Michelle Manhunt [phonetic]:  Thank you.  My name is Michelle Manhunt with the Council of the Americas: The word preoccupante does not begin to sum up what we are hearing this afternoon.  But let me point out that we are in an unusual moment in our history in United States because we are less than 60 days out from an election.  We have had two U.S. ambassadors kicked out of the country, a third not able to present credentials, all in a span of a few days.  These are very worrying facts for diplomatic history and for practical reality.  Given that we are so close to our election, given that it is such a close election, we need short-term steps that we, as the United States, both government and non-government, can take in response to what is going on there. 

The foreign minister eloquently laid out what her vision is, standing up against a lot of threats in Central America, but she also talked about common policy along the lines of what functions in Europe, a very interesting goal but something that we are probably not going to see in the next few months. 

So my question to you is what can be done to support the process that these presidents of the more solid and centrist South American countries are doing to move things along to nourish a process and [indiscernible] process?  For Bolivia for example, what can state and non-state U.S. actors do to support that?  Because we are in a countdown to our own election, everyone, everywhere knows that, so we are limited in our ability, in our clout, if I may say that.  I doubt that somebody would have kicked out two ambassadors of newly -- what can we do to support that, because it is very encouraging that the presidents of Brazil, Chile, et cetera, have taken these steps, we want to see that, move forward and have the greatest chance for success.

Jaime Aparicio:  Thank you, Michelle.  I would say that precisely that, they should engage these last months with -- much more with Brazil and Chile and Mexico and the case of Central America, and give them a greater role than even the OAS.  I think because the leverage of Brazil, at this moment, is very important in Bolivia and it is probably the only president, President Lula that both sides respect.  So the fact that even the governors are sitting regardless that there is one of the protectors is in jail, accused of the killing with no proofs and things but is in jail, and despite that, there is a meeting, is that really President Lula decides to put all of his weight in these things. 

So, I think the U.S. could be much more engaged with these countries at this point to work with them.  I think it is the only thing they could do, because also, this anti American sentiment is being exploited by Chavez and by many of these people, and they know that in the case of, and this is not a political comment or wish, but in the case that Obama wins, they would not have any argument to attack a new a president and says he is conspiring.  They know this is the time they have to use these months to make -- so, I think the U.S. should be much more engaged with these countries. 

I think President Bachelet is doing a really good job and they are really committed, and they are ready to stop President Chavez, not publicly, they are not going to do that publicly, but it is very clear if you read in the lines of what is happening in this meeting and the declaration of Minister Foxley and that, that they really stopped him.  So, I think that is the only thing I could see these months.

Michelle Manhunt:  Question about trade preferences, extending or not extending trade preferences to countries like Bolivia, how would that play out?

Jaime Aparicio:  Well, I do not think in this case, the Bolivian thing would work.  They would really –- Congressman Engel said a month ago that they were decided to prolong this, to extend this preference to Bolivia, and there was general agreement that they should expend for the three countries, for Colombia, Ecuador; what happened is that they went to Bolivia.  They had a conversation with the president.  They were decided to do that, and then they came with this thing with the ambassador, and I think that is going to affect, really in the case of Bolivia. 

I hope in the case of Colombia it would pass through, but I do not see it happening in the case of Bolivia.  I do not know if you were at the meeting of the Inter American Dialogue and the CAF where even Thomas Shannon was saying that they are willing to help with the ATP that gives [inaudible] that they are trying to have a good relation and divide the ideological differences with helping the people and then suddenly pass him a paper and it was very clear that they were kicking out the behind of the U.S. ambassadors. 

So I think they are, this is a very confrontative attitude and it is based on this idea, we want to change the system in the country.  We can’t have a good relation with a government that would impose conditions.  For example the MCC, I worked for three years in that project.  We presented a project more than $600 million, was going to be the biggest project.  Bolivia had all the Washington consensus that was very well-positioned to qualify.  It was pre-approved, this project, and then when new government came, they say they do not want, and U.S., why they do not want?  Because this a project that imposes you to respect free markets, free expression. 

There are 17 elements that you have to commit with you, but if you are trying to change your system to a communitarian or a socialist system and you are not interested in those projects.  And with Iran and Libya and Venezuela, he could get probably the $600 million or a little bit more.  So what is the interest of having the U.S.A. grabbing this; there is no interest.

Roger F. Noriega:  You know that is one of the points that the foreign minister made about a European Union sort of arrangement.  The fact is that –- when we are all signed up and just, “Where’s my check?”  I mean, it comes with a stack of rules, a guide, regulations from the floor to the ceiling here.  We can’t even give one of our best friends in the region, Mexico, anti-drugs assistance with two or three conditions, about corruption, without them going crazy. 

Can you imagine the U.S. showing leadership by saying, “We want to have an economic union here, but you’ve got to respect, just, the five essential elements of democracy in Inter-American Democratic Charter or transparency or sanctity of contracts.”  They tell us to jump out of a window but there will be, and I think we can go forward with new arrangements like Nancy Lee [phonetic] is pushing these investment communities, and the new –- we are going to have a renewal here in this country too, one way or the other, whether it is McCain or Obama, and a new messenger and a fresh presentation and then fresh opportunity. 

But I do not think we can go about this exercising leadership, to be perfectly candid.  I think we do need to be more clear than we are today about our basic principles.  Because believe it or not, there are people in Bolivia who are trying to do the right thing, and they need to know that there is an upside in that the Americans at least stand with them; same in Venezuela and in Ecuador and everywhere else.  And they need to hear from the United States a message other than, “Well, we will work with whoever is elected,” which for a government like the ARENA government in El Salvador which has troops on the ground in Iraq, to hear from the lips of the U.S. officials, “We will work with the people who want to kill you if they manage to get themselves elected with the largesse of Hugo Chavez,” it is a little uninspiring in terms of American leadership and that is the message we are giving to one of our best friends. 

So we can do better there in terms of making clear that we will support our friends.  But in terms of leadership, I do like very much the idea of a kind of a collective approach with the Brazilians, who by the way, have to be willing to show some leadership, and that is the only way they operate, of course, and that is the way all governments operate.  Brazilians are, only now, sort of, being more assertive as they are confident at home.  And why are they confident at home?  Because they have strong institutions and they are benefiting from economic growth precisely because they are playing by the rules.  So that makes them a good partner. 

And therefore, everything you say about George Bush, our relations with Brazil have probably never been better.  Well, we had troops there during World War II, but have not been better in the last 50 years, and it is in large measure because of George Bush’s personal relationship with President Lula, which is sort of an interesting story.  Somebody ought to write a book about that.  If I thought anybody would pay for it, I’d write it.

Jaime Aparicio:  Also, there is an additional element there with Brazil that it has imported beside the gas is the problem of drugs.  Because no drug from Bolivia is coming to the U.S. at all, zero drug from Bolivia is coming to U.S.  It is all going to Europe through Brazil, and Brazil is now the second largest consumer in the world after the United States.  And all the violence in Rio and Sao Paulo is now related to drug traffic.  And now that they have taken out the DEA and with Chapere; it is a free area of the Americas and all these stories, they are very concerned because that is a lot of investment that they would need to take care of their borders, and they know that that problem is going to affect more Brazil than the U.S.  And this is new, and that is another issue that Brazil might be very concerned.

Roger F. Noriega:  And they are learning.  It is very interesting what’s happening with Brazil and they are showing a little leadership in Paraguay and they are guided not when --

Male Voice:  [inaudible]

Jaime Aparicio:  I think that Mexico will have an important role in Central America.  There was a moving [sounds like] in Latin America; we have had this consulting political group, the Rio Group, but then for obvious reasons, they changed that and they created this UNASUR, it is the Union of South American countries.  That basically is now the political organization that is dealing with us and Mexico is excluded.  So, this is going to be a –- has to do with the leadership that Brazil wants to have in South America.

Roger F. Noriega:  I would like to see --

Jaime Aparicio:  It would be difficult for Mexico at this point to be enrolled in --

Male Voice:  [inaudible] has paid attention to Mexico.  Is this a country that Brazil respects as the only counter country [cross talking] in South America and Latin America?

Jaime Aparicio:  Exactly.

Roger F. Noriega:  Well, the Brazilians I think have a competition with them, but I have actually written about the idea of the U.S. President having privilege dialogue with the President of Mexico and the President of Brazil; regular, frequent, no-agenda dialogue to work out things like, “Jiminy!  What are we going to do with the OAS when it is under feckless leadership?”  It is a worthless organization today and everybody knows that.

One last question.  Larry [phonetic] has a question.

Larry:  Ambassador Aparicio, you and I were discussing this before the meeting.  Could you comment for the group about what might be called the Venezuelization of the Bolivian Army right now?

Jaime Aparicio:  This is -- I would say that more than -- of course, there is presence of them, but what is a great problem is that they are basically supporting, financially, the air force.  So that is a way to have a lot of control on them.  And for some reason, the chief commandant of the army the other day had a very strong declaration, saying to Chavez that Bolivia does not need their troops and they would solve the problems within the Bolivians, and Chavez got so angry and furious and publicly insulted the commandant and said that he was a traitor and something that is unbelievable but it happened [cross-talking] so the declaration of President Chavez at the commandant in chief.  So this commandant has now a lot of support in Bolivia with people and other military.  But other militaries maintain silence because of this pressure and this, of course, way of Venezuela controlling most of the Army.

Male Voice:  And also, if I could add on, the Bolivian Army remains, from when I was there, a conscript army, basically Quechua, Aymara-speaking Indians from the Altiplano the demographic that would normally support Morales.  So in the old days, if we could call it, if there was an internal crisis, the army would then move against the President.  At this point, that would seem to be rather doubtful that that could happen given the makeup of the army and the Venezuelans operating it, as I understand it, at company level.  Therefore, a control that you cannot really plan and plot a coup, as they could do it in previous years.

Roger F. Noriega:  Javier?

Javier El-Hage:  I want to answer a former question and pretty much was, what can the U.S. do in order to try to address this issue that is going on in Latin America?  I would say, first, the sophisticated answer would be resuscitate, take out of the drawer five elements of democracy, take out of the drawer the Inter-American Democratic Charter, five elements to make them work together in institutional systems, promote them in the Americas.  But a much simpler question that gets you to the same point is just allow the people to actually decide, the people to know what is really going on in their countries and what are their leaders really all about. 

How do you achieve that?  By a free press.  What is happening in Latin America and happens in every single dictatorship in the history of humanity is that what the government tells to the people, what is really going on, is not what is really going on.  So, when the people actually know what is going on, they change their government and they have another government.  For example, if there are any people in Cuba, actually citizens that believe in the socialist ideas of the president, probably they knew that Cuba is the single country that has signed the most quantity of bilateral investment treaties in Latin America, which is the international type of instrument more liberal in terms of opening your market to transnational corporations. 

If people in Cuba know that while Fidel is talking against privatization, the water they are drinking every day in Havana is provided by a monopoly, a huge transnational corporation from Spain, they would probably start doubting and probably elect the next president that just comes and say, “Okay, we are going to just make a bid and get the best company to provide the water for the people.”  So that is in the case of Cuba.  In the case of Venezuela, if they knew that the money that they are getting from oil is actually going elsewhere, they would probably not elect them the next time. 

But these governments typically treat the independent press, treat whoever criticizes them as an enemy, as an anti-patriotic.  In Bolivia specifically, words are racist, fascist, separatist, those are the words that -- everyone that disagrees with the government, those are the words used against them.  So, what happens in the U.S.?  Take a subway and there is this magazine place and you just see all the pictures of Obama and the picture of McCain, you do not know whether they are -- most of the times, there are pictures depicting the bad face of them just in order to talk against them and that is healthy for democracy. 

You have this New York Times case which the Supreme Court decided that criticizing the government is actually very healthy for a democracy.  That is just out of the question in current governments in Latin America.  Criticizing the government is going against the people, against your homeland, going against -- the governments take this opposition of being the redeemers of society just as any dictator in any time of humanity. 

So, free press is a very important single issue that if you address thoroughly, you will see that people are intelligent enough.  Salvadorans are intelligent enough to choose who should be their president.  And if they elect these former guerilla leaders, there is no problem because if they know the truth, if they really do not like that government, in five years, they are going to elect another government.  That is healthy.  That should happen.  The problem is that when the next government starts attacking the free press, starts attacking the institutions and that have them in five years with not have a whole different society in place.

Roger F. Noriega:  The one reflection I would make about that, Javier, other than the fact that I would love to see the New York Times go to Bolivia is -- all of them, not just a couple of reporters -- is that I was in the cab the day after with Michael Mays [phonetic], as a matter of fact, the day after Chavez got elected in 1998 and the cab driver said, “Well, yes, I voted for this guy, and I hope he does a good job.  And if he does not, I’ll vote him out.”  And I said to myself, you poor son of a gun, you are never going to have a shot at this guy through elections, and frankly, you had at least one or two processes that were more, sort of democratic, but that is it.  And they are never going to have another crack at him through a democratic process, ever, in my view.  That is a sad reality.

Well, this has been interesting.  I want to thank you very much for joining us for our first Bolivia day, but it is fascinating what is happening and we need to reflect a bit, take a lot of the very interesting words that we have heard today, including the questions and do some thinking about how the next administration might respond to challenges and opportunities ahead, and we thank you very much.  We apologize for going over.  I apologize for the wrong time on the meeting notice, and we will see you again.  Thank you very much.

[Applause]

[End of transcript]