American Enterprise Institute

Taiwan’s International Space: With a Keynote Address by Ambassador John R. Bolton

September 19, 2008

10:45 a.m.	Registration
11:00	Panelists:	Carolyn Bartholomew, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
		Louisa Greve, National Endowment for Democracy
		Randall Schriver, Armitage International
	Moderator:	Dan Blumenthal, AEI
12:00 p.m.	Luncheon
	Keynote Speaker:	John R. Bolton, AEI
1:00	Adjournment

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

Proceedings:

Dan Blumenthal:  -- new think tank called Project 2049 Institute, and Louisa Greve who is the senior Asia person official at the National Endowment for Democracy, very well-known for her expertise in democracy assistance in that part of the world.  We are very pleased to have her. 

To my right is my good friend and colleague from the U.S.-China Commission, vice chairwoman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, permanent chairwoman of the China Commission who has spent years on Capitol Hill working for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and who really can think through some new ideas for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community and how Capitol Hill might be able to be engaged in that process as well.

So I’m going to give the panelists 10 to 15 minutes each to talk about ideas for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community.  Taiwan has taken a new approach since President Ma has been elected.  They have not applied for the General Assembly but they have applied for 16 different functional agencies inside the United Nations.  So far, the PRC has still blocked their participation but Taiwan is holding out hope to be more of an active member taking a very pragmatic approach to be part of functional groups.  It gives Taiwan an international personality without moving the very contentious issues of sovereignty to the fore.  Without further ado, let me turn it over to Randy.

Randall Schriver:  Dan, thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to discuss this issue, and thank you for putting me in such fine company.  I’m honored to share the panel here with my colleagues. 

This is, for me - I got to be candid - a bit of a difficult and sometimes uncomfortable issue.  On the one hand, being in the U.S. government and advocating for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, you feel like you are on the side of the angels and you feel good doing it, it is the right thing.  On the other hand, there are very few issues you can come before an audience and say after eight years, four years at the Pentagon, four years at the State Department, I’m here to announce we have made absolutely zero progress. 

It is one of those frustrating issues, and it is one that I fear we have been losing ground in the last few years and now, we are at a point of transition in Taiwan and perhaps in Beijing but I’m going to address that question in my remarks.  There may be game-changing events that will affect the dynamics but I’m unfortunately not terribly optimistic.  I look forward to hearing from my colleagues if they can boost my hopes and optimism here a little bit.

What I would like to do is focus a little bit on the China side of the equation.  For me, it is fairly easy to dispense with some of the other questions: Should Taiwan be in international organizations?  Do they deserve it?  I think it is without question they deserve it and belong in international organizations.  People often talk about their size; Taiwan is a small place, but if you look from an objective point of view, Taiwan is not that small, not that diminutive.  It has 23 million people, a greater population than Australia.  Its economy range in the top 15 in the world and it is larger than many of the major economies that are big players in international organizations.  So from my perspective, it is fairly easy to dispense with that question.  Do they deserve it?  Do they belong?

It is also fairly easy for me to dispense with the issues surrounding can the international community benefit from greater international space for Taiwan?  I think again, clearly, the answer is, yes, particularly when you look at many of the international organizations which are - they get to very technical specific issues and Taiwan has significant expertise in many of these fields, the medical and scientific communities, the academic and research communities dealing with a variety of issues that are addressing these international organizations and by the international community.

So dispensing with that, I would also dispense pretty quickly with the position of other members of the international community not named China.  I do not think we should be confused and think that people are taking principled stands on sovereignty and questions of statehood and is there a legal argument one way or the other.  The vast majority if not all the countries who have a say on these matters are essentially bending to the will of China and are either bending to direct pressure or making what they view as pragmatic choices.  It is a fairly futile process to address something like the UN given China’s vetoes we are not even going to try.

So let’s also dispense with that notion that there is conflict within the international community.  I think most countries - if not all - would on the merit say this is something that we can all benefit from.  Taiwan certainly deserves it but we would also benefit from Taiwan’s participation.  So the obvious problem and the obvious question dealing with China and China’s views.  There is a new narrative about China’s openness, their open-mindedness, their willingness to accommodate the new government in Taiwan, and I want to talk a little bit about that.

Clearly, Taiwan and Mainland China were able to move out swiftly on a number of initiatives after the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou, and that is to their credit.  It is something that I have supported and others have supported, but we need to be very clear and sober-minded and objective when analyzing what has been accomplished.  This really was the low-hanging fruit and this really dealt with a number of initiatives that started under the DPP: the cross-strait charter flights; the lifting the caps on the number of tourists; starting to raise the levels of investment in both directions.  These were all programs either initiated by or championed by the DPP; in fact, with Ma’s inauguration and the political climate improving between the two sides, they were able to move out on these things quite quickly.  Now, that does not mean they are not consequential but again, what this suggests is moving into other areas could be a lot more difficult than the first few months of the Ma administration might have us believe if we are not paying close attention to what has been accomplished.

The much more difficult issues for China, there are two: international space and security.  And there are many in Taiwan who are starting to articulate and convey this is the real barometer of China’s goodwill and the way we will judge if China does believe this is a game-changing event, an environment where a new era of cross-strait relations can be embarked upon.  But interestingly, of the two, security is actually a bit of an easier issue to deal with in a lot of ways.

There are things that can be done on the security front that are highly symbolic and there could be payoff and reward but not terribly consequential.  When you think about what it would take for China to move back a few hundred missiles from the place where they are currently positioned opposite Taiwan.  Well, highly symbolic, it sends a strong message that China may be interested in confidence building and reducing the current environment of threat and intimidation and coercion.  Consequential, well, you can move missiles back pretty easily and you can do it within days if not hours depending on how far you are wheeling them back.

So there are a number of things that China could do on the security front, not that we are here to talk about the Taiwan arms sales or the notifications but I’m shocked and stunned that the administration would unilaterally put a halt on further arms sales without extracting at least something along the lines that I’m talking about.  I think there are plenty of ways that that could have been used for more leverage - if that was the intent of the administration.

But the question on international space is actually much more difficult for China.  As I understand it, there is a debate ongoing in China, in Beijing principally, and it goes something like this.  On the one hand, this is perhaps the best opportunity that China will have for creative thinking, new initiatives, making gestures that will be well received by the population in Taiwan given Ma Ying-jeou’s administration and given the hand they have extended toward Beijing.  So we should take the opportunity, we should move now, including on the difficult issues of international space.

The counterargument to that in China has been, wait a minute, Taiwan is a democracy and we do not know four years later, the DPP or some candidate could come back with different views on international organizations, international space, and exploit our good gestures for the purpose of furthering Taiwanese independence or promoting sovereignty in a way that we cannot deal with.  So this is a very risky proposition to start to move on international space even if we think we are locking in terms that are favorable now.

Now of course, there is a counterargument to that, which is, well, but if we do not work with the current administration, we create a self-fulfilling prophecy.  If there are no victories and deliverables and things that Ma Ying-jeou can point to for the public in Taiwan to say, “My administration was able to deliver for you including on the difficult issues of international space,” well then, you make it more likely that another party comes to power to push the agenda that you are not comfortable with.

But I think there is something else we need to keep in mind as well about the internal deliberations and the debate that may be going on in China.  There is a golden rule and a principal rule in Chinese bureaucracy which goes something like this.  It is never career-enhancing to take a moderate or a liberal position on Taiwan issues or progressive position on Taiwan issues in a Chinese bureaucracy, and even given the signals in the tone established by the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, there are bureaucrats who say, “Wait a minute, these guys are not going to be around forever.  Five years is the scheduled time for another transition but if it is not five, it is whatever it is - 10 years - they leave the scene.   Do I want to be the person who is sticking my neck out and say, yes, come on, let’s let Taiwan in the World Health Organization.  Let’s let Taiwan in all these international organizations which may later bring up questions of sovereignty and independence.”  And there is a great reluctance among bureaucrats for their purpose of self-survival to be a part of this effort.  So there is a bit of a slow rolling we are told within Chinese agencies and the bureaucracy to address this issue.

So all in all, I think this is a very difficult issue for China.  The signals they are sending on the cross-strait agenda that they intend to pursue further economic opening first, so the charter flights go from weekend flights to daily, other measures dealing with investment and a variety of direct commercial shipping adding that to the air links.  So there are a variety of things that they are considering that stay in the economic realm.  They may be considering some security measures that are in a category of confidence-building measures but they are, as I described earlier, fairly inconsequential but highly symbolic.  The international space questions I think remain the most difficult for them, and that is why I, unfortunately, am not as optimistic as I would like to be.

Just one final comment about what this means for the U.S.  I think the options for the U.S. to help Taiwan promote this agenda include continuing to pressure China - I think that is a given - but working to build an international coalition, if you will, to start to reframe the debate for China and start to suggest to them that it is pragmatic and in their interest to start to help Taiwan increase its international space.  This is not as easy as it may sound.  We have had difficulty getting even countries that are rhetorically supportive of Taiwan to do the heavy lifting when it comes to votes in the World Health assembly in terms of other fora.  So I think it is not easily accomplished but it is something that we can work on irrespective of China’s views, whether they are softening, hardening or other.  So I think that is something.

The final thing we can do, and this gets to some work that Dan Blumenthal and Louisa and I engaged in over the course of the last year.  It is we can help promote for Taiwan a different kind of international participation and international space outside the existing international organizations if need be, involving Taiwan in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian disaster relief, partnering with Taiwan on democracy promotion.   I will not say more because I think my colleagues will address that.  Doing things that helps Taiwan leverage its expertise that it has that it is not in a position now to contribute to international organizations but finding other modalities and venues for them to do so.  So I think there are options for the United States to assist Taiwan even given this very difficult environment I described in China.  Thanks.

Dan Blumenthal:  Thanks a lot, Randy.  In the spirit of being flexible and pragmatic, I have changed the plan here.  We are going to go until 12:00 and then let Ambassador Bolton speak and then we all have to stay through all that to get your lunch at 12:40 because everybody -- we will have some time for questions before Ambassador Bolton speaks.  Louisa Greve has asked me to be stricter in terms of restricting time - something my kids never asked for - but Louisa, you get 15 minutes exactly and we are going to stop you, and then Carolyn, you get 10 minutes exactly and we are going to stop you.  So Louisa, go ahead.

Louisa Greve:  Thank you, Dan.  Randy and you are both very modest in not actually showing you the report that was a result.  I’ll do that now.  This was the Taiwan Policy Working Group.  No doubt, you have all read the report, but if not, you can find it on the AEI website.  I want to express my appreciation to both of you for leading that effort.  I do want to focus on the theme of democracy, Taiwan’s international space as a democracy.

We take for granted Taiwan’s achievements over the last 20 years, I think, so to put even more emphasis on some of the dispensable items that Randy just mentioned, its economic and its political development are success stories.  They are rarer than we would wish in the world.  They really make Taiwan stand out in the region, in Asia.  Taiwan should be unabashed in taking pride in its peaceful, successful democratic transition.  I argue that, in fact, its democracy is its greatest strategic asset.  If Taiwan were not a democracy, where would its friendship with the U.S. be today?  Where would goodwill be coming from anywhere on the world?  It is indispensable.

A word on the practical level about the distinction that Randy has already referred to between the sovereignty issues and non-sovereignty issues, I do think that Taiwan’s government should do more in this direction.  It has already gotten there and Taiwanese society needs to step up because there should be a distinction between government efforts for international space that implicates sovereignty and international space that does not implicate sovereignty.  We want to distinguish between government efforts on the one hand and non-governmental and also sub-national governmental international space on the other.  It seems to me that in the face of this somewhat grim situation, and I have to agree with Randy, so far, China does not seem to be backing off, one has to exploit these mazes that are there, and I think the so far unexploited space has to be at the non-governmental level.

Looking at a parallel strategy to the efforts of Taiwan’s diplomats, the non-governmental strategy has to focus on strengthening institutional ties at these lower levels.  We could call it a thickening of ties as opposed to efforts to elevate Taiwan’s status; rather, Taiwan needs to focus on thickening ties around the world.  In this perspective, city to city ties, the agency to agency ties, the governors, the inspector generals.  C.C. was just telling me there is a delegation coming up of state inspectors general to Taiwan.  These are not second best.  These are in fact an essential part of a deliberate parallel strategy to build for the future and for the long term.

The biggest problem for Taiwan is that it cannot act as a normal actor internationally, but there are some spaces where Taiwanese hosts and visitors can be treated normally.  Taiwan can and should do more to make more of those happen to introduce more counterparts around the world to Taiwan.  As I mentioned, it is often forgotten, its success story is forgotten and simply to create goodwill and to be known and to make friends around the world even more than countries has to be done at that level.

That is successful already.  Taiwan’s businessmen are treated normally around the world.  Academia, as you mentioned, medical researchers.  There is nobody who says, “That Taiwanese medical researcher cannot come to our academic conference,” or at least it happens a lot less than at the governmental level, science and technology.  And our report concluded, and I would strongly urge people to pay attention to even more areas like these: the non-governmental sector in particular; charities; humanitarian relief; best practices in good governance; global environmental issues; civic involvement for youth and so on.

One way to think about this strategy is a kind of “build it and they will come” strategy.  I think we used the term centers of excellence in the report.  How do you push back against the PRC government’s apparent wish to snuff out and strangle even some kinds of non-governmental ties for Taiwanese entities?  The Taiwanese entities are so good that people just naturally want to reach out and take advantage of that.  And so that should be an extra spur for Taiwanese institutions to not be afraid to advertise their excellence and to in fact then reach out because of their future on behalf of their entire society.

On the governmental side, I do want to mention one standard government toolbox that has been relatively underdeveloped and in fact is undergoing review right now.  The foreign ministry has embarked on a review of its foreign aid programs with the goal of greater transparency and being more in tune with advanced standards on good governance as a criterion for foreign aid.  This is a very welcome development.  Taiwan has long needed to get out of being only caught in the dollar diplomacy race and instead look at the substantively valuable foreign aid programs that in and of themselves are like a center of excellence.  That is something that is simply valuable to the recipients that put Taiwan in the top flight of international actors that it is just simply a small country that has made good and is doing the right thing.

Specifically, even the Taiwanese institute, the International Cooperation and Development Foundation, which is one of the foreign aid arms, has a very small volunteer program.  For comparison, the U.S. Peace Corps had a high at 15,000 volunteers a year, and now of about 8,000; Taiwan sends less than 100 volunteers abroad per year under this program.  That is sort of a low-hanging fruit to increase Taiwanese interaction abroad just through a government program.

On democratization, specifically, Taiwan again has done the right thing.  It established five years ago, in 2003, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.  That was a development in fact strongly urged by my organization, the National Endowment for Democracy, and our president, Carl Gershman.  It has had a budget of $5 million a year.  It is nonpartisan and we all know actually how difficult if that is difficult to achieve in the U.S., the U.S. NED is bipartisan.  In Taiwan, it is governed by a multi-partisan board of directors.  It is an accomplishment.  It has a dual mission, both strengthening democracy in Taiwan but also abroad.  And as they say, a primary concern is to further consolidate Taiwan’s democratic system, promote democracy in Asia and actively participate in the global democratic network.

Their grant-making program, a third of the funds go to civil society in Taiwan.  There was an initial focus on simply strengthening civil society and consolidating Taiwan’s own democratic institutions.  And now, there is a new emphasis on enabling Taiwanese NGOs specifically to engage internationally, so again, completely aligned with this idea of a parallel strategy to thicken ties at all levels. 

One third of the money goes to Taiwanese political parties, which is something that might be an unusual thought for Americans but this is very much in line with the European democracy promotion foundations who in fact allocate money based on percentages of seats in a parliament for those parties to conduct international programs.  In fact, in the TFD case, it is the international work of the political parties as well as some domestic programs specifically focused on strengthening democratic values. 

And then a final third of the grants go to international NGOs and this is a more familiar program.  It is just like what an NED does in giving grants to pro-democracy groups around the world.  Then there are fellowships and publications and awards.

What more could Taiwan do?  Keep going in this direction, certainly increase the TFD budget - $5 million for five years in a row, it needs an increase - so for those friends of Taiwan who can urge the Legislative Yuan to increase the budget, that would be a good thing.  And a specific priority I would urge would be to do more in the area of helping Taiwanese NGOs engage internationally.  They are too isolated in a way that is unnecessary.  For the government, we know why that is.  Randy is right, it is PRC government pressure.  In the case of Taiwanese NGOs, there should not be nearly the same problems, and for the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy to encourage with grants all kinds of Taiwanese NGOs to simply be better at representing their society in making sure Taiwanese institutions are represented at conferences and programs and simply in the international work would be very worthwhile.

The third point about Taiwan Foundation for Democracy as it goes forward is not to try too hard.  When this initiative was first announced in 2002, one of the MOFA officials explained the hopes for the new foundation.  “It will greatly enhance the country’s profile as a democracy advocate, boost the country’s efforts to break away from diplomatic isolation imposed by Mainland China and help it to join international organizations.”  As several of us noted at the time, the latter two should be a byproduct of the first.  That is, a foundation like this should do democracy work well, should represent best practices, should extend a hand of friendship based on shared democratic values, and the international respect should come as a byproduct.  So that would be a theme that I would also want to emphasize in general, both in Taiwan’s government’s actions and non-governmental actions.  Be a good international citizen, show how excellent you are.  It has got to be a parallel strategy to the direct diplomatic efforts of the government.  I’ll end there.  Thanks.

Dan Blumenthal:  Thanks a lot, Louisa.  Those were some excellent ideas and some excellent points.  I would note I read in the newspapers today and yesterday that - I’m not saying this is because of our report - but President Ma has adopted some of these ideas about just complying with international standards when it comes to development assistance and so forth and making the point that just the compliance, even if you are not part of some of the institutions, people will take note that you are being a good international participant.  It could be a coincidence that our report advocated that but who knows?

Carolyn has great experience in the human rights field and in the aid and assistance field as well as on Capital Hill in working for years and trying to see how to financially operationalize some of these ideas as well.  So, Carolyn?

Carolyn Bartholomew:  Thank you.  Thanks to both of my colleagues here.  It is always an honor to be on a panel with them.  Randy, I’m afraid though if we are thinking that you need optimism from me, we are in very bad shape.  My disclaimer just to begin is that the views that I express today of course are my own and do not represent the views of the China Commission.

I think it is important for us all to think about where we are today and had we been having this discussion a month ago, I think it would have even been different.  As we speak, Secretary Paulson and Fed Chairman Bernanke are on the Hill talking about an economic meltdown.  And I think frankly and honestly that given the amount that the U.S. now depends on Chinese investment in the United States to keep our treasury afloat, to keep our economy afloat, the reality of us being able to expect that the U.S. government would be able to or be willing to pressure the Chinese government on Taiwan’s international space is probably not what we would like it to be.  And I think we really need to focus on that and recognize that the corollary to Randy’s talking about what is not career-enhancing in Beijing is I think frankly, it is not career-enhancing in the U.S. government to rock the boat.  And I suspect that there are a lot of people who are not interested in rocking the boat right now.

I also have found myself thinking, over the past few days in particular, but for a while, what do we do about the fact that we have essentially spent eight years with no progress on these issues?  We can go back further.  I cannot even remember who it was who said that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.  So what I tried to do is to try to come at this thinking about it differently. 

There is a form of incrementalism that has been taking place as the Taiwanese government has been taking different approaches, and I recognize and commend them for changing the way that they have been talking about their role in international organizations.  But I think that we really have reached a stage - and Louisa made some reference to this - that we need to talk about meaningful participation in the international community and not limit our definition of community to international organizations because I just think that we all need to be thinking about new ways to approach this problem to try to get some success.

In that, I always refer it back to the idea of taking the issues out to the public.  NGOs are an important way of doing it but how many people - not those of us who are people who focus on these issues but other people - really know or think about or understand what is gained and what is lost by Taiwan’s blocked participation?  Taiwan has an enormous amount of knowledge, of technical expertise to contribute to the international community, and I think that we really need to think creatively about ways to talk to the public about that - directly to the public.  A public relations campaign of sorts but not one that necessarily bashes China but one that talks about what it is that Taiwan has to offer.  And I think specifically right now, people would probably be quite amenable to issues related to health.  We all know the challenges and the risks when Taiwan is not participating in the WHO to safety, product safety in particular, and on issues related to the environment.

So I think in a lot of ways, what we should be thinking about is ways to go outside of our usual ways of doing business and how Taiwan can reach beyond that.  A mention was made of the academics who go -- well, how many of those scientists - other scientists, scientists from other countries - who participate in these academic conferences recognize the limitations on what role Taiwanese scientists can play, and how do we tap into that expertise?

I was thinking about this in part because I just got an email the other day from CSIS, I think, they were doing a forum on infectious diseases in China.  I thought, well, now what about if we get more think tanks, more people, more academic exchanges where people are focusing on what Taiwan has to offer?  And you make the case that Taiwan has so much to offer that all of a sudden, people again who do not think about these things are just saying, “Well, why can they not provide this information or this expertise?”

I think in some ways, we need to take this out to the grassroots however we define it, grassroots in different countries of scientists and academicians and health practitioners, people who are concerned about product safety.  All of these things are issues that touch everybody’s lives, but I suspect that they do not know it and they do not see it in terms of what Taiwan has to offer.  Maybe Taiwan has done this and I’m not aware of it.  But maybe it is time for Taiwan to sponsor a major health conference on a particular sector of health crises.  Do not make it governmental, make it academic, make it NGO, make it something that is -- look at the international AIDS conferences that take place.  If you can take something and run this parallel structure outside of any kind of government symbol, then I think that maybe we can make some progress.  So then it becomes a no-brainer that people -- again, it makes lots of sense to us.

One of the reasons I have been thinking about this as I was talking to friend who is not in the foreign policy world about Taiwan’s international space.  He said, “Well, don’t think the answer is to just recognize Taiwan and all of these issues are cleared up?”  Now, I’m not putting that out there but there is clarity of thinking --

Dan Blumenthal:  Ambassador Bolton will be here --

Carolyn Bartholomew:  There is clarity of thinking for people who are not focused in this but might be focused in other ways.  Surely, there must be exchanges going on between universities in Taiwan and universities in the United States and in the UK and all sorts of places.  I commend this community for having done an excellent job of mobilizing Congress and focusing on Taiwan’s participation at the WHO, but it did not get where we needed to be.

So now, I think that we really need to focus on a different kind of mobilization.  I’m not talking about taking out ads in the newspaper all around the country that say this is what Taiwan is doing.  It is something I think a little bit more sophisticated and nuanced than that, but to focus on particular sectors and build those relationships so if and when the time comes again to try to make a push, you have people in Kansas and people in Nebraska and people in Devonshire, England who are saying, “Well look, there is all of this information and all of this expertise and all of this knowledge, we do not understand why the people of Taiwan are not allowed to use it in this kind of official capacity.”

So that, I think, is the best.  I wish I had an easy answer.  I think if there were easier answers, people would have implemented them, but I just think it is time for us to think outside of the way that we have been thinking about it and try to come up with these different ways of approaching it.  Thanks.

Dan Blumenthal:  Thank you, Carolyn.  Those were excellent ideas.

I think that if you look at the different baskets of public goods that Taiwan can provide, we have talked about this amazing and often taken for granted peaceful transition to democracy, which is obviously rare nowadays.  You can talk about the incredible expertise that Taiwan has in the public health sector and disaster relief sector.  Then of course, you can also talk about amazing expertise and transitioning from basically an agro economy to one of the highest tech economies in the world.  If you take Carolyn’s ideas and others, you get in that groundswell of expertise out into the world and creating an open door over time or creating more of an argument in some of the places throughout this country and other countries that really matter and branding Taiwan as the country with the real reserves of soft power.  I think it is an excellent idea.

The other comment I would make is that I think China is making a big - we have some Chinese friends here - making a very big mistake here politically although it is risky to move forward on meaningful participation.  Some of the things we are talking about here benefit China, benefit the world community in general also as the links between Taiwan and China, people to people links continue infectious diseases and AIDS and all these sorts of things at a very practical level benefit China as well as lessons learned in Taiwan about economic growth and protection of intellectual property and so forth.

I think the United States is making a big mistake also in not -- taking Carolyn’s point that we are in a financial crisis right now but the United States without U.S. leadership, these things simply will not happen, and I think there were some quiet promises made to the Ma government that the U.S. government is shamefully not following through, whether it is arms sales or whether it is being more proactive on international participation.  If you had a group of experts or officials in the U.S. government, most of them deal with Taiwan in a context of cross-strait relations.  What we need to do is set up an entirely separate office that just deals with Taiwan international space issues, separate from cross-strait relations and that is something that can be fixed within our own government.

Do you have a point?  Go on.

Carolyn Bartholomew:  Related but a little bit different which is, I do not know how many of you here in this room actually admit to reading the New York Times.  But the Sunday New York Times travel section had a huge piece on food in Taiwan.  Now, I do not know how much tourism follows those articles but I suspect it does, and that is the kind of openings, food and science.  Why do we not have science sections of the newspapers having big articles about Taiwan’s breakthroughs on science that can benefit everybody in the world?  There are a lot of opportunities out there to build support that I think is a necessary precursor now to moving forward officially on space.

Dan Blumenthal:  That is right.  The Washington Post ran a travel section I think two years ago on traveling to Taiwan as well which was some of the best PR Taiwan can get.

Let’s open it up to some questions.  We have about 10 minutes for questions.  You know the rules of the game; identify yourself and wait for the microphone and please, keep it to a question rather than a comment.  Thanks.

Charlie Snyder:  Charlie Snyder of Taipei Times.  I just wanted to mention something about that article.  If you noticed the headline was “Food from the other China” as though Taiwan was part of China.  [Audio glitch] as good an advertisement as we might think.

Carolyn Bartholomew:  Well, it was saying other China, not as in Mainland China so I think you could take that one and parse it either way, but I think that it will probably spark some interest in Taiwan and take that interest and build on it, I think, is what we really need to do.  Otherwise, we are going to end up spending another four or eight years and having this conference in another four or eight years and being in the same place.  So for me, it is a reaction to we can keep banging our head against the wall - I think we need to - but I think that it also behooves us all to figure out other ways to try to get to the same place.

Dan Blumenthal:  I actually had forgotten the headline.  I just remembered the descriptions of Taipei but that is exactly the kind of thing we want which is for someone first reading about Taiwan and Taipei, they will not miss their focus on how good the food is in Taiwan and want to go there, and they will not focus on all the little things we focus on here in this community, whether it is part of China or not.

Wenchi Yu Perkins:  Wenchi Yu Perkins from Congressional-Executive Commission on China.  Thank you for all your great comments.  I have a big question.  I think we have talked a lot about what Taiwan can do, and I think in terms of its international space, there is not a lot Taiwan can do but also a lot relies on the international community.  So my question is, well, for example, how can promoting democracy and human rights in China can have any impact or promoting dialogues between the two sides, not government to government, but more non-governmental sector and exchange programs between the two sides can have any impact creating more space for a Taiwanese?  Even potentially sort of engaging the Europeans, engaging those people who have advocate for democracy and human rights can really have any impact on creating international space for Taiwan.

Louisa Greve:  Just to respond to a small part of that, in fact, it is important to engage with China and not to delude oneself about how prevalent these views are but there are intellectuals and people with creative thoughts about how China’s own international profile should change, and I’ll give one example.  NED is funding a new journal that is starting October 1st specifically to explore China’s international role, nationalism in China, how China should deal with cross-strait relations but also how it should deal with Africa and Asia and so on.  We do not hear any pluralism on these views from within China.  China’s own commendable opening, something to commend China over -- about it too over the last 20 years in diversifying intellectual life should be taken advantaged of for sure again as a long-term strategy.

Dan Blumenthal:  I would agree Louisa which is that sometimes we talk about China as this monolithic blob that gets up -- people get up everyday and say, “Gosh, if we only had Taiwan back, all our problems would be solved.”  Obviously, that is not true.  No matter what our friends in the Chinese government say, there is a lot more ferment there about thinking creatively both about China’s role and about different ways to think about Taiwan’s role and there is certainly not a monolithic view of Taiwan among people that we all speak to in China.

The international community question, it boils down to Taiwan’s best friends and what they are going to do for them, and that starts here in the United States and then other countries - Japan and India - may go along.  And Taiwan, I think, has natural friends that it does not take enough advantage of it in the new democracies in Europe who would be much more friendly to Taiwan’s overtures both in terms of the non-governmental types of initiatives Carolyn was pointing to but as well as trying to gain more support.  I think Taiwan has to be very specific about what that international community entails, and who are the people that will not lift a finger and who are the people that may actually take some risks and push forward for them?

Randall Schriver:  I just want to add on the international community.  I was really surprised at how difficult this was for us in government when we worked on the World Health Organization.  Our major breakthrough was a rewrite of the international health regulations, given language that could be interpreted to mean that Taiwan would be covered by the IHR.  And I will not name names, name countries, name and shame people, but we could not get countries to say, okay, you do not have to release an announcement, you do not have to acknowledge this but how about if asked, just say, “Our interpretation would be this and it includes Taiwan.”  Countries were unwilling to step up even to that which I consider is pretty benign.  How about winking?  How about nodding?  And countries in the most benign incremental steps were pretty unwilling to do it.

There is one thing I think we all skipped and that is how to raise Taiwan’s profile within international organizations that they are currently in, and I think there are things we can do.  What always comes to mind for me is within APEC, the fact that Taiwan’s leader is not a part of the leaders’ meeting, their foreign ministers not a part of the ministers’ meeting.  I think this is something that APEC countries could acknowledge the changing dynamics in the cross-strait environment, acknowledge that this is an opportunity for all of us.  I’m not sure who is hosting the next APEC but these events, there are subgroups and working groups in APEC, they are all-year round.  How about raising the profile of Taiwan’s participation in these organizations?  And how about the next time the United States hosts APEC - whenever that is - we invite the leader of Taiwan to come wherever that is held?

Shih-Chung Liu:  My name is Shih-Chung Liu.  I’m currently a visiting fellow at the Center for Northeast Asia Studies at Brookings Institution.  I was also the vice-chairman of a research and planning committee at Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Actually, I met Louisa and we talked about this a couple of months when I was still working for MOFA.  I have two questions.

I think all this discussion is about two issues; one is leadership and the other one is about the reallocation of the resource.  My experience working for DPP government shows that, still, even under former President Chen Shui-bian’s leadership, we still place the maintenance of or even increasing of Taiwan’s diplomatic ties on top of foreign policy agendas.  So there is always some sort of secret funds, secret foreign aid programs hiding in our annual budget. 

But based on this principle, we still use very limited resource just so that launch -- within the MOFA to launch so-called public diplomacy campaign by, for example, educating the domestic audience for those efforts that the Taiwanese MOFA has made toward our allies in Africa and also for those tiny island countries in South Pacific, not to mention countries from Central and South America.

So some people in Taiwan start getting to know a little bit about this but in most cases, it was often sidelined by another unique scandal like what happened to P&G scandal.  So still, I believe most people in Taiwan still have no idea about what the government has been doing in terms of providing those humanitarian aids to countries in Africa, and despite the fact that they know that, those countries are not Taiwan’s allies.   But I tend to see a window of opportunity when President Ma was inaugurated because he sort of highlighted this importance of pursuing diplomatic truce with the other side of Taiwan Strait.  And also, MOFA had cut some funds in those secret foreign aid programs.  And the idea is to maintain the current 23 allies without spending extra money to buy one, another one, for the sake of not irritating the other side.

But I see the window of opportunity.  If the current administration, if the current leadership can take this seriously and engage in some sort of reallocation of resource to those programs that we just mentioned earlier, I think that would be a very good opportunity for Taiwan to engage.  I do not know if you have talked to this President Ma or to people from the MOFA.  Are they serious about this?  Because I have never heard anything about this public diplomacy approach that the DPP government used to --

Dan Blumenthal:  Thank you.  First of all, we have MOFA here and they are taking diligent notes on everything you say, but I think it is not just a question of PR in Taiwan.  I think to the point that Randy was making and Carolyn was making and that Louisa was making, building support within countries inclined to be friendly through their parliaments or parliamentary caucuses or you go to certain countries in Europe, for example, and you get surprised to find that they actually have a Taiwan caucus but they do not have that much interaction with Taiwan. 

Building the ground-up support then when you actually have an initiative government to government that you actually have people within those governments being able to put some pressure when their executive, the equivalent of their executive branches are going weak-kneed on an easy proposal, I think, is even more important as building the grassroots support and using public diplomacy and other means within those targeted countries.  Does anyone else have a comment?

Carolyn Bartholomew:  Yes.  I think what I’m struck by and reacting to is this belief or almost limitation that this needs to be government-driven.  I support Louisa’s recommendation that more money be provided, but as soon as you make it a government-driven initiative, you run up against the usual barriers which is, okay, this is the government of Taiwan trying to position itself to do something vis-à-vis China.  And I’m trying to think outside of that box.

The scientific community, for example, I have been stunned several times in hearings that we have had about scientific and technical exchanges between the United States and China, how our scientists do not see the boundaries of nationality.  Stunned only in the sense of they kept saying, well, information is information, it does not matter who has it, which is a different topic.  But there is very fertile ground there for the sharing of knowledge and the sharing of expertise on any number of fronts.  And I think once that sharing is taking place - and I’m not in the scientific community so perhaps it is happening more than I think that it is - but once it is, when people start recognizing that there are artificial boundaries that are out there for governmental and political purposes, they might react differently.

To me, it is just nuts, frankly, that Taiwan is restricted in its participation in the World Health Organization.  That has consequences for the health of all of us.  And yet, how many scientists who work on epidemiology or public health challenges, how many health practitioners are really aware of that and to everything that it means?  And the best way they can learn about that is through their peers in the scientific community.

So what are the strengths that Taiwan brings to the table?  What does it have to offer to the world community?  And it does not need to be within that governmental context.  I think what I’m thinking about there is building outside of it and then seeing once you have that going, can you transfer some of that into this international organization context?

Dan Blumenthal:  Question right here.

Tion Kwa:  Tion Kwa from the Asia Society.  A very brief question - how realistic is the prospect of a U.S.-Taiwan FTA which would certainly dollop a few notches Taiwan’s profile?  How realistic?

Dan Blumenthal:  Pretty unrealistic.  If you had an administration friendly to FTAs in the last eight years who were doing FTAs for all kinds of reasons, not just economic reasons but for political reasons as well, and they did not exert themselves too hard on Taiwan FTA when they had the chance.  And the mood in the Congress about FTA has shifted quite a bit - FTAs in general, not just Taiwan in specific.

My personal view, going back to the APEC, there are two issues.  One is going back to the importance of APEC and making that institution because Taiwan is already part of it and all members realize the importance of Taiwan’s economy to their own economies, using APEC and the different FTAs that had already had been signed in Taiwan in Asia as a template, including Taiwan in the process of competitive liberalization is probably the way to go.  Reinvigorating APEC because Taiwan is there and it would stanch the economic marginalization of Taiwan as well.

Carolyn Bartholomew:  I think it is an important point.  FTAs, they are now carrying the burden of all of the concerns about globalization and I think given the lineup of other FTAs that are there that Dan’s characterization is right in terms of realistically, what can we expect?  Maybe we need to go back to the drawing board and draw up something else and call it something else so that it is not automatically put in that box of FTAs; we have problems with FTAs.  But I always feel this obligation despite the fact that I started out pessimistically to try to end on a note of optimism, which is that Taiwan has survived and has thrived in spite of enormous odds against it.  And I think that it is really the ingenuity and the strength of the people of Taiwan that we have to count on to carry this forward.

Somebody asked earlier about China-Taiwan and U.S.-China-Taiwan democracy activists.  The reality is we do not know what the seeds we plant today will bring us as any sort of harvest tomorrow, and if we do not recognize that, just pick up the newspaper everyday or check Google News, things are unfolding in ways we cannot even imagine.  So I think that we have to figure out - here I am really talking in clichés - new ways to put those seeds out there in as many different areas as we can in order to make sure that when opportunity comes up, that there is something to harvest.  So I think any avenue that is there in order to try to pursue is absolutely worth pursuing because we have to do it.

So I think that while I feel pessimistic about the reality of U.S. government leadership or success in terms of getting Taiwan international space in the international organizations, I feel very optimistic about the resilience of the people of Taiwan and the ingenuity of the people of Taiwan to be able to help come up with some new solutions to this problem.

Dan Blumenthal:  Thank you.  I wanted to thank the panelists very much.  Their work is done.  They cannot have lunch yet but if they want to stick around and have lunch after Ambassador Bolton speaks, they are welcome to.  You could shift from panelist to audience if you would like, and we are very pleased to have Ambassador Bolton here to speak to us right now.  I’ll wait to introduce him until he comes up.

We are very pleased to have Ambassador Bolton address this group on the issue of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in UN functional bodies and throughout the international community to address the increase or potential increase in Taiwan’s international personality.  Everybody knows Ambassador Bolton very well for his many, many years of public service, including most recently as ambassador to the United Nations.  I think he will speak for about 20 or 25 minutes and then take a few minutes for questions.  So without further ado, go ahead.

John R. Bolton:  Thank you very much, Dan.  It’s a pleasure to be here today and to have discussion on this very important issue, which is Taiwan’s status among [Audio skips] in the world as a whole?

I think it is especially important given that the United States is in the middle of a presidential election campaign and particularly, as we come up this Friday to the first debate between the two main candidates, which will be on foreign policy and national security issues.  So one never knows what questions the candidates are going to be asked but I think certainly, we will see a lot of their attitudes on a number of issues and what that might portend for the future.

Obviously also, we have had a significant development in Taiwan with the election of President Ma Ying-jeou, his inauguration and taking office, significant in many respects I think for Taiwan and the world.  This is now the second peaceful democratic transfer of power between parties in Taiwan.  I do not know that there is any bright line where you can say that a system has become a fully functioning democratic system.  Certainly, the first step is to have one transfer of power peacefully and democratically between parties.  That does not guarantee the future and probably the second transfer does not either, but it is an extraordinarily significant milestone, and combined with all of the other robust political life that we know on Taiwan - a very free press and intense political competition - that this is very significant.  I think that has to affect both the attitude of the two capitals principally concerned with Taiwan’s status and its future - Washington and Beijing.

And it seems to me that President Ma has started off his tenure in office by hewing very closely to what he said in the course of the presidential campaign in Taiwan that he would try to focus on Taiwan’s own economy given the relatively slow growth compared to other Asian economies during the tenure of his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian.  And also that President Ma would undertake a different approach to Beijing.

Now, with respect to the economy, as you may have noticed in the past couple of weeks, we are having difficulty on a global basis.  It is a particularly difficult environment therefore for President Ma to try and undertake the steps that he has promised.  And politics can be a cruel profession, a president can be judged on his or her performance even if the circumstances that they face would be difficult for anyone to make progress, but that was the issue that President Ma focused on and I think was a major reason for his success.  And it is no surprise that in Taiwan, this remains an issue of great concern to the people and a great subject of political debate.

On the second issue, relations across the straits, President Ma did, again, what he promised he would do by opening the possibility of more predictable and more stable relations with Beijing.  He took a number of steps I’m sure you are all familiar with to indicate he is serious in this matter.  And I think that by so doing, he obviously undertook a significant political risk because if Beijing fails to reciprocate in visible and appropriate ways, President Ma will be subject to criticism in Taiwan that he opened up, he made concessions; in effect, he gave Beijing opportunities that Beijing did not follow up on.

Now, we are obviously in the middle - perhaps even more accurately stated the early stages - of President Ma’s overtures and I do not now want to draw conclusions prematurely but I would say at least judging as of now, Beijing has not responded as appropriately as they should, not responded the way President Ma probably thought they would.  And this is going to pose, I think, substantial questions for the continuity of the president’s policy because it is clear from the fine line that he is trying to walk, that he is not simply - let me put it this way - he is not going to perform like the U.S. State Department.  After they laid down certain concessions and they do not get what they want from the other side, they just laid down more concessions; until, finally, they get a response.  I do not read Ma Ying-jeou that way.  I think he has made the overtures, he has extended his hand, and we are really still waiting for the kind of response from Beijing that could allow progress to be made on the variety of steps, political and economic, that might lead to a further lessening of the tensions across the straits.

So I think that really leaves the issue of the future direction here, at least, let’s say, over the next 12 months very much up in the air.  And we have seen other shifts in Taiwanese policy that reflect, I think, President Ma’s efforts to lower the rhetoric between Taipei and Beijing and to see if there is not a possibility for more constructive discussions.  That obviously is reflected in the UN environment where the emphasis will be even more than before on Taiwanese participation in the specialized agencies of the UN system rather than the annual head-on confrontation in New York about membership in the UN itself; a policy that - I used the word confrontation advisably - it was always a very quick event because the item of Taiwanese membership never even made it on the agenda of the General Assembly.  Beijing was always able to block it.  There were never a significant number of states that could move the issue. 

And I think the main obstacle from the outset, from the very beginnings of Lee Teng-hui’s campaign for UN membership for Taiwan, the basic obstacle was really not Beijing, it was Washington.  Because now two successive American administrations have been unwilling to take up the challenge even considering applications for membership in the specialized agencies of the UN system such as the World Health Organization.

This is a piece I think of the larger policy debate in Washington about how Washington should treat Taiwan.  It has been going on since the Carter administration’s withdrawal of democratic recognition.  Even before that, going back to the decision to admit Beijing as a full member of the UN and to strip Taiwan of its membership illegitimately under the UN charter; while, we are it, the resolutions I think are facially contradictory to the charter’s own provisions for membership in the organization.  It is not a subject I will get into at length here.  I have written about it for those of you who are fascinated by the UN charter explaining what was wrong with it and how it might be corrected.

But just looking at the issue today politically, the fact is I think Taiwan’s efforts we can see historically we are doomed from the start without active American support.  Absent American support, Taiwan was left to try to rally the relatively small number of countries that still do have formal democratic relations with it and the ambivalent or indeed, in some cases, outright negative attitude of the United States doomed the effort to failure no matter how vigorous or how prolonged Taiwan’s own democratic efforts were going to be.  I think that really poses the question for Washington in a very graphic way; especially as I noted before, we have a presidential election campaign underway, to try and look again at how Washington should treat with Taiwan, what the relationships between Taiwan and the United States should be and what the consequences of changing those relationships would be for the important U.S.-Chinese relationship.

I have long felt that Washington’s attitude was based on an erroneous analysis even of Washington’s own best interest.  If you believe that the fundamental American interest in cross-strait relations is stability, is the absence of the use of military force or the absence of provocative behavior by one side or the other that raises tensions and increases the risk of military force, I think we can now see that the ambiguity in America’s own political and diplomatic posture actually helps contribute to instability because it is not clear either in Taipei or in Beijing exactly where America stands.  And therefore, the risks of uncertainty, certainly in a worse case scenario, actually drive the issues in cross-strait relations to making them more difficult to resolve rather than less difficult to resolve.

And I think the reason for that can be seen in the obsession with which commentators and policymakers look at statements made by Washington officials really from the president on down to try and read into the meanings that - just based on my experience in government - I would have to tell you, are often simply not there; comments that achieve almost doctrinal significance that are actually uttered if not completely off-the-cuff, at least under the pressure of drafting speeches or press guidance or other similar exercises.

My own view is that looking at basic American interests and considering what to do with Taiwan, looking at the importance of Taiwan in the international economy, looking at it as a successful demonstration of a country that actually does what America recommends it to do, that is to say, establish democratic institutions, freedom of the press, and other individual freedoms and is succeeding at implementing these freedoms, that it really is in the interest of the United States to extend full diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.

Now, this is something that could have happened back in the Nixon administration, the Nixon-Ford administration, when the efforts by Beijing finally to take the Chinese seat in the UN came to fruition.  It was a possibility then actually that Taiwan rejected the idea of mutual recognition because Chiang Kai-Shek simply could not accept that one day that the Republic of China would not prevail over the People’s Republic of China.

Now since then, Beijing has used the in terrorem threat of withholding diplomatic recognition from any other country that recognizes Taipei and promised all manner of terrible things that would happen.  And that has had a considerable effect, as I’m sure all of you know, on the decisions by countries around the world to grant or withhold diplomatic recognition.  It is simply not credible to think that Beijing would break diplomatic relations with the United States if we recognize Taiwan.  They would not like it at all.  I understand that fully.  But they are not about to do something that would have significant impact for them politically and economically.  I think you would have a long period of grumbling.  They would probably recall their ambassador from Washington.  They would probably declare persona non grata a number of our declared intelligence people in the embassy in Beijing.  There would be a few demonstrations outside the embassy and there would be some heated rhetoric by Chinese public officials.

But, fundamentally, the fact is that under any series of criteria that the United States has had for whether and under what circumstances to extend diplomatic recognition, recognizing Taiwan would not be an anomaly.  The anomaly is not granting recognition now.  And I think having once granted recognition, it becomes clear to Beijing that however ambiguous the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, however uncertain the ups and downs of military sales to Taiwan - and they certainly have gone up and down over the years, mostly down in recent years unfortunately - but whatever these vicissitudes of either diplo-speak or government-to-government relations, that the extension of full diplomatic recognition would be a clear statement by the United States that Taiwan deserves that kind of status vis-à-vis the United States.  And I think that would have an obvious profound impact on Taiwan’s space in the world.

What are the odds of that happening?  Not very great actually whether it is an Obama presidency or a McCain presidency, but I think it is important to discuss this possibility because it really has the small virtue of being the most logical thing that the United States should do even if it is perhaps among the least likely politically.

So if that is not possible, what should a new administration do?  I think there are several things that could be done immediately.  I think all of the petty restrictions that we have imposed - not just on Taiwan - but that we have imposed on the United States for the benefit of Beijing in dealing with Taiwan should be lifted.  I think Taiwanese officials should come into the State Department.  I think we should allow the Taiwanese ambassador or representative or whatever you want to call him to live in Taiwan’s house and not just hold receptions there.  I think we ought to in fact eliminate these constant irritants that do absolutely nothing diplomatically and which, in effect, are as burdensome on the United States as on Taiwan.

When I was in the State Department, it was a pain in the neck to have to go across the street to some restaurant to have a cup of coffee with the Taiwanese ambassador because it benefited Beijing.  Why could I not sit in my office and have the representatives from Taiwan come and visit me just like representatives of every other country?  It was easier on me, and obviously many other officials, not to have to get up, walk across the street in the rain and terrible things like that.  This is an inefficiency the United States creates for itself.  I never have understood it; I do not understand it now.  That is, to be clear, a fairly superficial set of steps in the big picture.

But I think if the new president is not willing to extend diplomatic recognition, that and many other things - upgrading, changing the status of the representative offices and a variety of other things - that could quite easily be accomplished.  It would be a powerful signal.  And in this instance, support for President Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts to say, look, we want better relations with China.  We are not going to declare independence.  We are not going to do things with the name.  We are not going to do a lot of other things that Beijing does not like.  But we are going to assert ourselves as a free and democratic people have every right to do.  And the United States should support them not just out of affection for representative government and individual liberty but because it is in America’s interest to do so.

So we will see what happens over the next several weeks of our presidential debate.  I think it is incumbent on the government of Taiwan to make its own decisions what it wants to press for.  Everybody knows when you have a new administration in Washington, it is not completely tabula rasa, but it is a chance for some changes, and changes that are made in the opening days of a new administration are not likely to be challenged in the flood of other things that are happening.  So the aim, if there is going to be any change at all, would be to have these modifications made in the week or 10 days after the inauguration.

That is my modest plan for moving forward with U.S.-Taiwanese relations.  I just want to thank all of you for coming today, and I would be happy to try and answer a few questions.  Thank you very much.

Dan Blumenthal:  Thank you very much, Ambassador Bolton.  If Taiwan has a chance of entering the political debate, you certainly contributed to that today.  So we want to thank you for that.  The absence of Taiwan from political debate is actually quite stunning this year.  Ambassador Bolton has generously agreed to take some questions, so if you --

John R. Bolton:  I know you are all waiting for lunch, too, so I do not want to be the last thing between you and lunch, but I would be happy to try and answer some questions.

Dan Blumenthal:  Well, they are probably hungry to ask you questions too.  If you can wait for the microphone and identify yourself, ask a question please.

Thomas Corcoran:  My name is Thomas Corcoran.  My connection here is that one of my clients is TECRO.  What is the political dynamic in China with respect to Taiwan?  Do we have any people in China which just say, “Well, let’s just be friends and if you guys want to be independent, go ahead?”

John R. Bolton:  Well, I do not know that if there is anybody who thinks that they are saying it out loud.  I would have thought that in response to President Ma’s overtures that we would have seen more of a response by China.  It would not be fair to say there has been no response, but I think that it has been far less demonstrative on the mainland side than would have been expected.  I do not know to what to attribute that.  I do not know whether it was focused on the Olympics or something else, but I do not think President Ma has an indefinite period of time in which he can wait for Beijing to respond.  So if in China, there is a view that a little bit more flexibility vis-à-vis Taiwan is a good thing, it would be appropriate to hear it because that at least would be a sign that due consideration is being given to the overtures that President Ma has already made.  And I must say, I have not seen that but there is a little bit of time remaining, I think, but not much. 

Yes, ma’am?

Peggy Chang:  Hi, Ambassador Bolton.  My name is Peggy Chang with Voice of America, China branch.  I was wondering.  I was not sure if you have already answered this.  But recently, the U.S. mission to UN released a press release stating supporting Taiwan’s participation in UN’s specialized agencies.  How do you view this because a lot of Taiwanese media are saying that this is the first time and the most showing of support that U.S. has for this Taiwan’s participation in the UN?  How do you see this press release?

John R. Bolton:  I have to say I did not see it as different from prior policy as you were implying in your question.  The distinction is between participation and membership.  It is one thing to be involved in the work of the World Health Organization or to contribute to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or UNICEF or some of the other agencies in disaster assistance and that kind of thing.  It is another though to actually be a member.  This is why I think the difficulty remains for Taiwan even if it does not pursue membership in the main UN to pursue membership in WHO or any of the specialized agencies. 

That requires demonstrating under their governing documents that Taiwan is a state, and a state within the customary international law definition of that term, which I think Taiwan clearly meets.  Nonetheless, it is fundamentally a political question that the specialized agencies normally do not like to address.  They say those kinds of questions should be handled by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

So in a way, Taiwan is caught in a Catch-22.  It certainly demonstrates its international status and bona fides by working in the specialized agencies, but it is a very difficult path to translate that into the political goodwill that would actually achieve membership in those organizations.  That is why I think ultimately, that effort, the whole effort in the UN system cannot be successful no matter how effective Taiwan is diplomatically without unambiguous support from the United States.  Because as long as the U.S. says anything less than, “We support full membership,” it is very unlikely that other major players in the UN system would get out front on the question for fear of irritating China. 

Yes, ma’am?

Nadia Tsao:  Ambassador Bolton, I’m Nadia Tsao with the Liberty Times and Taipei Times.  Actually, this is a follow up for the question.  We know that Taiwan has pursued its participation either membership or participation in UN since President Lee.  It has been a long time and even though people say we got some publicity in international community but it did not really go too far.  I wonder: do you have any recommendation or suggestion?  Should we just totally give up this promotion in the UN or find another direction to go ahead?  Or do you think we can base on what we have achieved so far, seek broader support from the U.S. and other members?  Thanks.

John R. Bolton:  Well, I followed this from the beginning, I think from 1992, 1993 when this was first mooted.  I do not know that I would have any advice after 15 years approximately of effort.  I do not know that I would have any advice that would get you to a better outcome.  So that is my sense that why President Ma adopted the course he has adopted.  It is a course that recognizes the political reality he faces.  And I think the focus of Taipei’s diplomatic activity really at this point, for the next, let’s say, six months ought to be on the United States - whichever of the two candidates gets elected - because without a fundamental shift by the United States to a position more affirmatively supporting Taiwan’s desire to enhance its status in the UN system, I just do not see diplomatically how Taiwan can make more progress.

I do think it remains in Taiwan’s interest to keep flagging the issue for the other member governments.  Because I can tell you, in my own experience in New York was that at least it causes them to say, “Oh boy, this is really unfortunate.”  That and 25 cents will get you a cup of coffee, as they say.  But you do not want to let the issue fade from Taiwan’s perspective.  Given the difficulty of achieving diplomatic representation, it will.

And I think even within the United States government, the risk is that you could always see returning to the surface the same attitudes that the State Department had in the late 1940s after the nationalist forces retreated to Taiwan when the State Department was issuing bulletins to Americans on Taiwan to leave because the communist were going to take over in about three months and throughout the 1950s when they kept basically hoping the problem would go away.  And there are still people, most of them supporting Senator Obama - I might say parenthetically - who still wish the issue would go away.

So it may seem like lobbying on this issue has been unproductive.  And in terms of achieving the goal of UN membership, certainly that is the case.  But I do think it has had other political benefits that warrant a continuation of the diplomatic campaign as part of the overall effort to protect Taiwan internationally even if not in the direction it began under Lee Teng-hui.  Yes, sir?

Michael Fonte:  Thank you, ambassador, for your excellent presentation.  I’m Mike Fonte.  I work as a consultant to the Democratic Progressive Party.  You noted rightly that it was Chiang Kai-Shek’s refusal to accept the position in the UN that would put him seated beside those bandits from across the strait.  There are people in Taiwan today - my friends in the DPP at least - do think that President Ma is going back to the 1970’s KMT position in many ways.  He has talked about the relations between Taiwan or the Republic of China and the PRC as special relations and not state-to-state relations.  He has used the phrase “The Taiwan region of the ROC.”  He has been willing to be called Mr. Ma instead of President Ma by people who come from China.

So I guess my question is pretty straightforward.  Have you had conversations - what is your sense whether President Ma would accept diplomatic relations from the United States?

John R. Bolton:  Well, I have to say, the last conversation I had with President Ma was in Taipei last August, the day after the investigation of him was quashed and he was certainly feeling in a pretty good mood that day for obvious reasons.  So I cannot answer your question directly but I think if you look at the list of things that he has done that you just read, that is part and parcel of his effort to extend the hand to Beijing, and I think that these steps were taken knowingly and intentionally.  I think he is recognized as being a careful and deliberate individual, and certainly with the awareness of the potential political cost of each and every one of them.  But he was prepared to do it consistently with the position he had taken during the presidential campaign.

Now, if there is no answer from Beijing, you would have to ask what the profit is to President Ma and his supporters to continue to leave those out on the table in effect unanswered.  I think his effort is to appeal to that category on Taiwan and I do not have the latest numbers in my head - some of you do.  Among those that this question that has been asked for decades, do you regard yourself as Chinese, Taiwanese or Chinese and Taiwanese?  And that Chinese and Taiwanese category keeps getting larger and larger.  And the number who says Chinese keeps getting smaller and the number that says Taiwanese goes up is in a somewhat smaller proportion.  But in other words, there is a huge plurality.  As I said, I do not know what the number is right now, I think it is well over a majority - it always has been - that says that people on the island imagine themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese.  So whoever wins that block in political terms is in good shape.

It would be hard for me to imagine that Ma would go much farther than he has already absent some sign of reciprocity from Beijing.  And then you would have to judge the reaction of the citizens of Taiwan to whether they consider that enough but I think that is the current state of play.  And the ball is clearly in Beijing’s court, and I do not think they have much more time.  In my sense any way, it would be they do not have much more time to respond.  Yes, sir in the back?

Toy I. Reid:  Toy Reid with the Congressional-Executive Commission on China.  Back in 2005 and 2006 when I was working at RAND, I did a number of interviews in China with their so-called Taiwan experts who advised the leadership.  And I heard, as you have probably heard, an endless surplus of paranoia and anxiety at the time about what Chen was going to do next.  And they were constantly putting pressure on the U.S. to constrain him in this way or to push him back in that way.  And oftentimes we responded sometimes, I think, somewhat reluctantly all in the interest of so-called stability.  And Beijing sort of backed off from its previous position in which it would sort of say to the United States, “You do not have a role at all in cross-strait relations.  It is completely internal and domestic, stay out of it.”  And they were actually coming to us and saying, “Could you help us out here with this problem?”

So what I’m wondering is how do you think the next administration can use some of that capital to urge Beijing to reciprocate to Ma and essentially say, “If stability is your goal, if you have recognized that you are not going to get your ultimate goal in the short term and you are just focused on keeping Taiwan from moving further away from what you would ultimately like to see, then why do you not take advantage of this opportunity here?  And if you do not, do not expect us to bail you out in the future.”

John R. Bolton:  Well, I do not see any reason why we should not say that, but I would not overestimate the impact that the U.S. can have on China’s thinking there because I also think it is important to push through the weapons sales that have been held up for many years more because of Taiwanese politics than anything else but which are now held up because of American policy decisions.  So I think that is important for the United States.  I think it is important for Taiwan.  I do not think it is going to win us a lot of friends and influence people in Beijing if the next administration goes ahead with it.

I think we have some tough issues that we are going to need to confront with China in the coming years.  In my judgment, the most important being North Korea where we have deferred far too much to Beijing in the conduct of the six-party talks which yet again, as we speak - I do not know, count it the 30th or 31st time - we are breaking down again unless the State Department finds a way to make another concession to Beijing before the administration ends. 

I think we have to raise the stakes with Beijing on North Korea.  And I think the risk as we have seen in the deferral of the arms sales here is that some in Beijing would like to make Taiwan part of the cost of that.

So I’m not sure how much capital we have, I guess, is the quick answer to your question on the issue.  And I do think we are going to be doing things - what we should be doing - both with respect to Taiwan arms sales and North Korea and other problematic issues - China’s continued support for Iran, for example, in the Security Council - that would limit our ability to press ahead on the Taiwan issue.  I think this is why it really is a cross-strait issue from that perspective, but it will not be for much longer if we do not hear something positive from Beijing. 

I will just take one more question over here if that is okay, Dan.

Male Voice:  [indiscernible], an exchange fellow from SFS at Georgetown University.  I have two questions.  First, in your lectures, you mentioned - you critiqued - the ambiguity of U.S. policy in Taiwan’s to say that it is time to make it clearer.  Does such kind of clear policy means the U.S. will offer far more diplomatic relationship -- permit to Taiwan and providing a blank check to Taiwan and that means to protect it with any possible attacks or something like that.

The second question is, generally speaking, the scholars both in China and the U.S. tend to think such kind of status quo condition is the condition that U.S. can benefit the most.  Will you not make or clarify of U.S. policy in Taiwan Strait which means maybe change this kind of status quo conditions?  So what is the benefit U.S. can get from this change?

John R. Bolton:  Well, with respect to the first question, it is now ingrained in many people’s minds that when we talk about the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, we talk about constructive ambiguity.  I think this phrase probably originated with Henry Kissinger, but it has been learned by every American Foreign Service officer in the 35 years since then, to our manifest detriment, it seems to me.  Constructive ambiguity in the hands of a Henry Kissinger is one thing; constructive ambiguity at lower bureaucratic levels is quite something else.  And I think the constructive ambiguity has reached the point where it is not so constructive anymore, which is why I felt that full diplomatic recognition, I felt for some time, it should be extended.

One of the changes that is occurring that dramatically affects cross-strait relations, of course, are decisions being made in Beijing about the nature and scope of Chinese military forces.  Not the least of which are the disposition of missiles whose proximity to Taiwan I think clearly explains what their mission is, but as well, Chinese efforts to acquire submarines, blue-water naval capabilities and a range of other assets that - if they have not already - threatened to change pretty dramatically the strategic balance in the Western Pacific and specifically that would have an extraordinary impact on Taiwan and therefore, implications for the United States and its defense commitments to Taiwan.

So my proposal to extend full diplomatic recognition is not a change in the status that comes out of the clear blue sky.  It is in the context of changes that are already being undertaken by Beijing.  And in my view, require interjecting an additional element of stability before the situation gets more dangerous.  This objective could be accomplished as well if Beijing would respond to President Ma in an appropriate way which they have not done.  And if they were to respond, that could certainly have an impact on questions of the timing of full diplomatic recognition.  Although my own personal preference would be just to go ahead -- I have recommended this 10 years ago, so it is no surprise my views have not changed on it because the situation has grown more difficult over time.  I think if you look at it in that larger context you can see that there’s justifiable concern that Taiwan’s position in the worst-case scenario of military force has been degraded over the past ten or fifteen years and that in the aggregate represents a significant change.

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