November 2005
China in Asia: Regional Institutions and Asian Integration
At a November 4 conference cosponsored by AEI and the National Defense University, experts examined Asian integration and efforts to create or strengthen regional economic, political, and security institutions. Will East Asian countries be able to build on largely bilateral trade and financial negotiations to construct regional political and security institutions? How will they reconcile or meld the overlapping activities of APEC and the ASEAN + 3 processes? What is the role of China in the pursuit of East Asian integration--leading, shaping, or merely reacting? Finally, what do the new integration efforts and plans portend for the United States’ long-standing leadership role in the region?
Sheldon W. Simon
Arizona State University
Until the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was generally considered the most successful regional organization among developing countries. However, due to the crisis, in the late 1990s ASEAN suffered a number of regional and bilateral security challenges such as the forest fires in Indonesia, the elections and independence of East Timor, drug trafficking on the Thai-Burmese border, and illegal Indonesian workers in Malaysia. The primary reason for ASEAN’s inability to effectively deal with these and other issues has been the organization’s adherence to the principle of non-interference. The expansion of the organization from the original five members to the current ten has also compromised the institution’s ability to respond to security issues.
The September 11 terrorist attacks may have provided ASEAN with the rationale and mechanisms to further transnational cooperation. Hopeful signs include ASEAN peace monitors in Aceh, coordinated patrols in the Malacca Strait, cooperation on SARS, and rethinking the non-interference principle in the case of Myanmar.
In the early 1990s ASEAN perceived a need for a regional security organization that would encompass both its Northeast Asian and North American partners, and thus founded the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Since the creation of ARF, ASEAN has been the venue for ARF meetings and has dominated the ARF agenda. In addition, the ASEAN consensus principle is used in ARF discussions. The ARF has been successful in improving transparency, putting in place some defense cooperation, creating a register of eminent persons, and extending regional security concepts.
The underlying concern, however, is China, the only extra-regional state with territorial claims in Southeast Asia. The ARF facilitates engagement with China and creates a forum to respond to China’s claims. In 2003 and 2004 China, Japan, and India acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and Australia and New Zealand did so in 2005. The United States remains the only great regional power that has not acceded to the TAC.
ASEAN’s original formation and recent expansion were in response to China. This required ASEAN to engage China on its own and under ASEAN rules. Whether these institutions have socialized China or whether they are just instruments that China is using to pursue its objectives in the region remains unknown. (These two possibilities are not incompatible). ASEAN + 3 has become more important than APEC and is increasingly dominated by China. Beijing has made other conciliatory gestures toward the region, including being the only non-ASEAN state to offer to sign the treaty establishing Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). China has abandoned its previous preference to handle territorial and other conflicts in the South China Sea on a bilateral basis. China has negotiated a framework agreement establishing a China-ASEAN free trade agreement. ASEAN understands that China is already a great power and only wants to shape the kind of power it will be. U.S. hard and soft power will continue to exceed China’s for some time; however, the United States should devote greater focus to regional institutions.
Evelyn Goh
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore
Evelyn Goh focused her comments on Southeast Asian views of China, the United States, Asian regionalism, and the potential U.S. response.
Most Southeast Asian perspectives on a rising China resemble one another. Southeast Asian countries prefer to view China not as a threat, but as a challenge and an engine of growth. They prefer engagement and even see engagement as inevitable. Because of its proximity, geography, and historical relationships, China is intrinsic to Southeast Asia in a way that the United States is not, both in regard to trade and regional institutions.
At the same time, almost every country holds serious reservations about China’s role, particularly in potential conflicts over the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. China’s success in diplomacy cannot be determined unless it ends in failure. All Southeast Asian countries acknowledge the United States’ regional security role and want the United States to continue to provide a security umbrella--although they disagree over the proper methods. All worry about current U.S. policies in the region.
Short-term reservations on U.S. policy and long-term reservations over Chinese intentions have resulted in a hedging approach. Countries in the region may lean toward one side but still pursue options with the other. There is confusion over how these two great powers are supposed to coexist in the region. China speaks to Southeast Asia on issues of mutual interest such as non-traditional security, but it is not clear that China has the capabilities to assist with regional security.
The region is therefore divided into three camps. There are countries which engage China but emphasize U.S. security relationships (Singapore and Philippines), countries that engage China but have serious concerns about the United States (Malaysia and Indonesia), and countries with geographical and historical ties to China with fewer options with the United States (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar). It is significant that all of the countries in this last group are located in mainland Southeast Asia.
In terms of Asian regionalism, Goh listed four challenges to the establishment of credible institutions: (1) key trouble spots such as Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, and the South China Sea; (2) the perception that the real goals of such institutions are to counter both Chinese and U.S. hegemony; (3) the need to fuse economic security with human security; and (4) the need to formalize roles, conduct, transparency and accountability, while coordinating various groups and supervising the implementation of agreements.
Asian regionalism is still very much a work in progress. There is a regional divide over which institutions to strengthen. Countries predisposed to China are likely to support Chinese initiatives, which are exclusionary, particularly to the United States. Other countries support inclusiveness.
China’s participation in regional institutions over the past decade has been both encouraging and improving. Since the early 1990s ASEAN has emphasized engagement with China. Beginning in the mid-1990s, engagement became a two-way process. Beijing has recently been more forward in its preference for ASEAN + 3 as the premier regional institution. The Chinese have also advocated for a China-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting in direct competition to the Shangri-La Dialogue. It remains to be seen how China will act in the East Asian Summit, but it is likely that Beijing will be inclined to simply let the ASEAN states bicker amongst themselves.
For the United States it is far too easy to dismiss regional institutions as “talk shops.” However, this may be a critical time for the United States to reshape its policies in the region. Rethinking U.S. policy should not be about competing with efforts to build regional institutions. The United States should focus on its strengths, such as building economic institutions, supporting development in the region, continuing to provide comprehensive security, and strengthening key bilateral relationships (not just with traditional friends, but with other frontline states such as Thailand and Indonesia). Finally the United States should coordinate with Southeast Asia on how to approach China. It is not a question of U.S. exclusion but rather the quality of the role of the United States wants in the region.
Claude E. Barfield
AEI
In spite of Simon’s initial skepticism about ASEAN’s inability to meet current regional challenges, Claude Barfield pointed out that the growing regional economic integration indicates a much stronger connection than do normal trade relationships. This signifies new implications for political and other regional relationships.
Previously it was unclear whether China had established trade and economic policies to deal with new sub-regional agreements. However, with China in the process of pursuing some sixteen new trade agreements, it is clear Beijing has a very active program. The Chinese have moved past their single-minded goal of WTO admission to a broader strategy of regional involvement. Governments in the region view trade agreements in political as well as economic terms.
The choice for the United States is to either reinvigorate APEC or adjust to the growing influence and expansion of activities of ASEAN + 3. However, domestic political institutions and internal dynamics hamper the U.S. ability to rise to the challenge. The United States should always openly seek a seat at the table in regional organizations, but whether the Bush administration actually wants to go to the table is ambiguous. In the region there exists a backlash against the U.S. preference for bilateral arrangements and its characteristic tendency to dominate regional discussions. The United States ought to consider changing its strategy and even begin moving in the direction of the “ASEAN way.”
National Defense University research assistant Tamara Shie prepared this summary.
